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DEBUNKING THE “END OF HISTORY” 
THESIS FOR CORPORATE LAW 
Leonard I. Rotman* 
Abstract: In their article, “The End of History for Corporate Law,” Henry 
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman proclaimed the triumph of the share-
holder primacy norm over competing progressive theories of the corpora-
tion. This Article debunks Hansmann and Kraakman’s “end of history” 
thesis on both U.S. and Canadian corporate law grounds. A critical exami-
nation of high-profile U.S. corporate law jurisprudence indicates that the 
shareholder primacy norm cannot be supported, even by cases such as 
Dodge v. Ford and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., which 
exist at the foundation of shareholder primacy arguments. Further, Cana-
dian corporate law jurisprudence and the structure of Canadian corporate 
law statutes reveal the complete lack of support for shareholder primacy 
arguments north of the forty-ninth parallel, further impeding Hansmann 
and Kraakman’s claim. This state of affairs demonstrates that Hansmann 
and Kraakman’s “end of history” thesis is, at best, premature and, at worst, 
incorrect. 
Introduction 
 In their provocative article, The End of History for Corporate Law, 
Hansmann and Kraakman asserted that as a result of their view of the 
profound dominance of the shareholder primacy model of corporate 
governance, society had witnessed the “end of history” for corporate 
law.1 They boldly proclaimed that “[t]he triumph of the shareholder-
oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now 
assured,”2 echoing Bainbridge’s earlier claim that “[o]ver the last few 
                                                                                                                      
* B.A., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., Faculty of Law, University of Windsor; Visiting Professor, 
University of Denver, Sturm College of Law (2010–11). The author wishes to thank Deb-
orah DeMott, Kent Greenfield, Ralf Michaels, David Millon, Wayne Norman, as well as 
participants in Duke Law’s Global Law Workshop on Comparative Corporate Law and 
Governance and workshop participants at Boston College Law School and Boston Univer-
sity School of Law for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors that remain in 
the paper are mine. 
1 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. 
L.J. 439, 439, 468 (2001). 
2 Id. at 468. 
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decades, law and economics scholars have mounted a largely successful 
hostile takeover of the corporate legal academy.” 3 
 Hansmann and Kraakman contended that the triumph of the 
shareholder primacy model was part of a worldwide convergence to-
ward a unitary vision of corporate purpose premised upon a share-
holder-centered ideology.4 Their view was that progressive notions of 
corporate governance had failed to sustain a serious threat to the 
shareholder primacy model.5 This “failure” effectively ended the strug-
gle for dominance between these competing approaches to corporate 
governance, a struggle that may be traced back to the debate between 
Adolf Berle of Columbia University and Merrick Dodd of Harvard in 
the 1930s.6  The primary implication of this “end of history” caused by 
the hostile takeover of the corporate legal academy was that the share-
holder primacy model had supplanted alternative theories of the cor-
poration that did not ascribe to the former’s characterization of corpo-
rate governance. 
 Hansmann and Kraakman’s assertion of the end of history for cor-
porate law, which provided a particular perspective on the function of 
corporate management, was published in the same year that Enron col-
lapsed and left large-scale corporate scandals in its wake.7 By asserting 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Cri-
tique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, 857, 859 (1997) (“The 
law and economics movement remains the most successful example of intellectual arbi-
trage in the history of corporate jurisprudence.”). 
4 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 443. 
5 Id. at 439–40, 443–44, 454 (discussing how the shareholder-oriented model of the 
corporate form is more commonly accepted than alternative models such as the manager-
oriented, labor-oriented, and state-oriented models). 
6 See A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1074 
(1931); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 
1365, 1366–69 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 
Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1162–63 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fidu-
ciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 194, 206–07 (1935). The 
crash of the stock market in 1929 no doubt influenced this debate. See William W. Bratton 
& Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern 
Corporation, 34 J. Corp. L. 99, 101–04 (2008) (offering a different perspective on the Berle-
Dodd debate, resituating texts in “historical and intellectual context”). 
7 The use of the term “management” here denotes both directors and officers. Al-
though there is little uniformity in the obligations of directors and officers under U.S. 
corporate statutes, Canadian corporate statutes hold directors and officers to virtually the 
same obligations regarding duties of care and fiduciary obligations. See Gantler v. Ste-
phens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009); see also Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, 
Recalling why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1597, 1600–01 (2005). 
Further, in spite of the differences that exist among various U.S. state corporate statutes 
and between these U.S. state statutes and Canadian corporate statutes, it appears that offi-
cers are now being held to standards more akin to those of directors in U.S. law. See Gant-
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that the end of history for corporate law had arrived, Hansmann and 
Kraakman attempted to subsume the lengthy and vigorous debate over 
the role of the corporation and the place of corporate management to 
their own vision of the corporate world.8 They articulated their thesis 
without substantive evidence indicating the triumph of the shareholder 
primacy model over competing progressive visions of corporate activity.9 
In so doing, they ignored the very real conclusion that, in 2001, many of 
the issues that plagued corporate law were the same as those that had 
hampered it years before.10 
 In 1934, then-Yale law professor and future U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas wrote a scathing attack on corporate man-
agement for its misuse, non-use, and abuse of corporate powers. The 
following passage captures the essence of his critique: 
[T]he criticism [levied at corporate practices] has been symp-
tomatic of indignation and disapproval of many different 
abuses and malpractices disclosed in recent years [including] 
. . . secret loans to officers and directors, undisclosed profit-
sharing plans, timely contracts unduly favorable to affiliated 
interests, dividend policies based on false estimates, manipula-
tions of credit resources and capital structures to the detri-
ment of minority interests, pool operations, and trading in se-
curities of the company by virtue of inside information, to 
mention only a few. These are not peculiar to recent times. 
They are forms of business activity long known to the law. . . . 
[B]usiness, and its legal advisors, have shown great ineptitude 
in appreciating and appraising the social importance and sig-
nificance of many of their activities.11 
 Such descriptions are now commonplace in the post-Enron era. 
Yet, Douglas’s seventy-five-year-old critique clearly and crisply indicates 
that some of the most pressing issues in contemporary corporate law 
involving the actions of management are not new, but are merely re-
cent incarnations of long-disputed matters.12 These matters continue to 
                                                                                                                      
ler, 965 A.2d at 708–09; Johnson & Millon, supra, at 1600–01; Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty 
to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at the Officer Level, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2009). 
8 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 449–68. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. 
11 William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305, 1306 (1934). 
12 See id. 
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arise precisely because of the ongoing debate over the proper charac-
terization of the function of corporate governance. 
 As vigorously as Hansmann and Kraakman have propounded their 
view of the dominance of the shareholder primacy model, other prom-
inent commentators have opposed this assertion and continue to do 
so.13 The latter have promoted a broader vision of corporate manage-
ment’s duties that includes not only shareholders, but also bondhold-
ers, creditors, employees, and communities. Indeed, a recently pub-
lished tête-à-tête between Greenfield and Smith intentionally harkens 
back to the Berle-Dodd debate.14 The continuation of this debate shows 
that the end of history for corporate law has not yet been reached—at 
least not in the manner or with the result Hansmann and Kraakman 
postulated. 
 This Article debunks the “end of history” thesis Hansmann and 
Kraakman espouse and provides a critical and comparative assessment 
of the foundational basis of their claim. In the process of addressing 
their claim, this Article engages both domestic and Canadian corporate 
jurisprudence. The scholarly and jurisprudential discussion about cor-
porate purpose has been a largely U.S.-driven phenomenon to date. 
Two recent decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court should change 
this outlook, however. Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise (“Peoples”)15 
and BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (“BCE Inc.”)16 will have a profound 
impact on the appropriate characterization of contemporary corporate 
governance and the “end of history” claim. 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility 3 (2001); Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 300–01 
(1999); Lynne L. Dallas, Corporate Ethics in the Healthcare Marketplace, 3 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 
213, 217 (2004); Kent Greenfield & D. Gordon Smith, Debate: Saving the World with Corporate 
Law?, 57 Emory L.J. 947, 965–66 (2008) (discussing Professor Greenfield’s rejection of 
shareholder primacy); Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 1713, 1716–17 (1993); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1373, 1376–77 (1993). 
14 Greenfield & Smith, supra note 13, at 948–1010. 
15 See [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 477, 482–83 (Can.) (standing for the position that directors 
of a corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation itself, not to individual stake-
holders (such as creditors), whose interests are protected by the honest and good faith 
obedience to the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation itself). 
16 [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 597–98 (Can.). 
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I. Background 
A. The “Beginning of History”: Historical Understanding of  
Corporate Personality 
 Academic commentators in various jurisdictions consistently ar-
ticulate that management owes duties to “the corporation.”17 This un-
derstanding is, however, merely a preliminary point of agreement.18 It 
is accepted that managers owe duties to the “corporation.” It is far less 
clear, however, how this managerial responsibility impacts corporate 
stakeholders. Are duties owed to the corporation as an entity with in-
terests independent of those of its constituents?19 Alternatively, is the 
                                                                                                                      
17 Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property 201 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932) (“[A]ny fair statement of the 
law would have to be based on the theory that the fiduciary duties of the director were 
limited to the corporation.”); Paul L. Davies with Daniel D. Prentice, Gower’s Prin-
ciples of Modern Company Law 599 (6th ed. 1997) (“[T]he fiduciary duties are owed to 
the company and to the company alone.”); John Glover, Commercial Equity: Fiduci-
ary Relationships 187 (1995) (“[T]he company ‘as a whole’ is unquestionably a proper 
beneficiary of its directors’ fiduciary obligations.”) (quoting Re Horsley & Weight Ltd. 
[1982] Ch. 442, 453–54 (U.K.); Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Gov-
erning Principles 377–78 (3d ed. 2006) (“It is absolutely clear in Canadian law that the 
person to whom corporate managers owe their duty is the corporation: not the sharehold-
ers, not the creditors, not the general public, but the corporate entity itself. There is no 
authority contrary to this well-entrenched principle.”). 
18 While directors and officers are not the only corporate actors who have been found 
to owe fiduciary duties in corporate fiduciary jurisprudence, they have been the primary 
focus. Indeed, corporate jurisprudence contains many examples of shareholders’ fiduciary 
duties, particularly duties of majority shareholders to minority shareholders. Two of the 
most notorious of these are Pepper v. Linton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) and Perlman v. Feldmann, 
219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). The rationale for holding majority shareholders to fiduciary 
duties to minority shareholders is expressed in Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogart, 250 U.S. 483, 
487–88 (1919) (“The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a 
fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself or its officers 
and directors.”). In opposition to domestic jurisprudence, shareholder fiduciary duty ar-
guments are not as prevalent in Canada or in the United Kingdom. See Jeffrey G. MacIn-
tosh et al., The Puzzle of Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, 19 Can. Bus. L.J. 86, 86 (1991) (“In 
England and Canada the courts have in the main clung steadfastly to the notion that con-
trolling shareholders owe no fiduciary duties, either to the company, or to fellow share-
holders.”). In this Article, the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), R.S.C., ch. C-44 
(1985), will be used to represent all Canadian “division of powers” corporations statutes. 
The CBCA is the predominant model referring to the statutory division of corporate pow-
ers between management and various stakeholders. This structure differs from the “con-
tractarian” model adopted from the United Kingdom that had previously existed in most 
Canadian jurisdictions. The “contractarian” model regarded shareholders as the fountain 
of corporate power and dictated that management possessed only those powers sharehold-
ers delegated to it. 
19 Constituents include shareholders, bondholders, creditors, and employees, for ex-
ample. 
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corporation to be regarded as an aggregate of these constituents, or as 
a representation of only some of these parties? This is where agreement 
among corporate scholars and jurists ends, resulting in one of the most 
contentious issues in contemporary corporate law. 
 The debate over whose interests corporate management must 
serve has existed almost as long as the modern corporation itself. One 
of the first cases to consider this issue was Charitable Corporation v. Sut-
ton,20 in which the directors of a charitable organization were held li-
able for breach of trust by failing to adequately monitor the charity. In 
Sutton, the English Court of Chancery held that management owed du-
ties to the corporate entity.21 In more modern corporate law, this same 
principle is readily observed across jurisdictions, in such cases as Car-
penter v. Danforth in the United States,22 Percival v. Wright in the United 
Kingdom,23 and Clarkson v. Davies in Canada.24 There is little, if any, 
contemporary debate over the corporation’s existence as a legal person 
separate and apart from the personality of its shareholders.25 
                                                                                                                      
20 See (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 642, 642–45 (Ch.) (U.K.) (holding the directors’ liability for 
the loss was based on their failure to monitor the charity, which in turn was partially re-
sponsible for a significant loss to the charity arising from fraud). 
21 Id. 
22 See 52 Barb. 581, 584 (N.Y. App. Div. 1868). The prominent precursor to Carpenter v. 
Danforth is the decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward. 17 U.S. 518 (1819). In 
Woodward, Chief Justice Marshall gave the following description of the corporation as an 
artificial entity: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly 
or as incidental to its very existence. . . . Among the most important are im-
mortality, and, if the expression be allowed, individuality; properties by which 
a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may 
act as a single individual. 
Id. at 636. 
23 (1902) 2 Ch. 421, 421 (U.K.). 
24 [1923] 1 D.L.R. 113, 120 (Can.) (originating out of the Ontario courts). 
25 A.V. Dicey articulated this principle in The Combination Laws as Illustrating the Relation 
Between Law and Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 513 
(1904). Dicey stated: 
When a body of twenty or two thousand or two hundred thousand men bind 
themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose, 
they create a body which, by no fiction of law, but from the very nature of 
things, differs from the individuals of whom it is constituted. 
Id. Within the realm of corporate law, this notion is most famously discussed in Salomon v. 
Salomon, [1897] A.C. 22, 38 (H.L.) (U.K.); see also Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, supra note 6, at 1160. 
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 Prominent examples of judicial interpretation regarding the ef-
fects of the statutory creation of corporations are the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Let-
son,26 and the English House of Lords’ decision in Salomon v. Salomon.27 
The implications of the statements made by the two courts are re-
markably similar. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Letson: 
A corporation created by a state . . . though it may have mem-
bers out of the state, seems to us to be a person, though an ar-
tificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state, and there-
fore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be 
deemed a citizen of that state.28 
Meanwhile, in Salomon, the House of Lords stated that “once the com-
pany is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independ-
ent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself . . . .”29 
 How does this historical understanding of corporate personality 
mesh with Hansmann and Kraakman’s “end of history” thesis? Is the 
corporation merely a funnel through which profit maximization for 
shareholders is the ultimate goal? Alternatively, are shareholders merely 
one of a number of stakeholder groups whose interests must be ac-
counted for in the conduct of corporate management? These questions 
must be addressed before the application of corporate management’s 
duties can be meaningfully considered. 
                                                                                                                      
26 See 43 U.S. 497, 558 (1844). 
27 See [1897] A.C. at 22. Even prior to Salomon, the notion that the separate legal exis-
tence of the corporation from that of its stakeholders was said to reside at the “root” of 
corporate law in Farrar v. Farrars, [1888] Ch.D. 395, 409–10 (U.K.). 
28 Letson, 43 U.S. at 555. The Court further stated that “a corporation created by and 
doing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a per-
son, although an artificial person . . . capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as 
much as a natural person.” Id. at 558. This judgment overturned the aggregate theory of 
the corporation established in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, where Chief Justice Mar-
shall said “[t]hat invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corpo-
rate aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and consequently cannot sue or be sued in the 
courts of the United States . . . .” 9 U.S. 61, 86 (1809). The Court continued: 
[A corporate] name, indeed, cannot be an alien or a citizen; but the persons 
whom it represents may be the one or the other; and the controversy is, in 
fact and in law, between those persons suing in their corporate character . . . 
and the individual against whom the suit may be instituted. 
Id. at 87. 
29 Salomon, [1897] A.C. at 30. 
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B. The Berle-Dodd Debate 
 With deference to the significant contributions of others,30 the de-
bate between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd initiated a longstanding 
discourse between shareholder primacy theorists and communitarians 
in legal literature concerning corporate duties.31 Berle and Dodd, like 
others,32 framed their discussion in fiduciary terms.33 Nevertheless, it is 
readily observed that their characterizations of the goals of manage-
ment’s responsibilities differ. In Berle’s view, the exclusive beneficiaries 
of these duties are the shareholders.34 Thus, “all powers granted to a 
corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group 
within the corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable 
                                                                                                                      
30 See Ernest Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations 7–14 (1897); John De-
wey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655, 673 (1926); Wes-
ley N. Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders’ Individual Liability for Corporation Debts, 9 Colum. L. 
Rev. 285, 319–20 (1909); Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 
404, 423–26 (1915–16); Alfred W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 
262–67 (1911); Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 
643, 662–67 (1932); Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 Colum. L. Rev. 594, 604 (1924); 
I. Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 517–18 
(1912). 
31 See generally Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, supra note 6, at 1049; Berle, For 
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, supra note 6, at 1365; Dodd, For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?, supra note 6, at 1146–47; Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the 
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, supra note 6, at 194. For an interesting 
and in-depth discussion of the Berle-Dodd debate, see Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 
122–35; C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospec-
tive for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 77, 82–99 (2002). On a related point, see 
also David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 216–25 (discussing Dodd’s 
theory that the natural entity model provided a basis for corporate social responsibility 
and Berle and Means rejection of the natural entity in favor of a shareholder-centered 
privatized conception of corporate law). 
32 See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 11, at 1306; I. Beverly Lake, The Use for Personal Profit of 
Knowledge Gained While a Director, 9 Miss. L.J. 427, 427–28 (1937); Chester Rohrlich, The 
New Deal in Corporation Law, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 1167, 1192 (1935); Chester Rohrlich & 
Edith Rohrlich, Psychological Foundations for the Fiduciary Concept in Corporation Law, 38 Co-
lum. L. Rev. 432, 432–34 (1938); Note, Clash of Personal and Corporate Interest as Affecting 
Business Activities of Officers and Directors, 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1008, 1008–09 (1935–36); Note, 
The Director of a Corporation as a Fiduciary, 20 Iowa L. Rev. 808, 808–12 (1935). 
33 Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, supra note 6, at 1049 (“[I]n every case, cor-
porate action must be . . . tested . . . by equitable rules somewhat analogous to those which 
apply in favor of a cestui que trust to the trustee’s exercise of wide powers granted to him in 
the instrument making him a fiduciary.”); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 
supra note 6, at 1147 n.6 (“That directors are fiduciaries for their corporations is indisput-
able.”). 
34 Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, supra note 6, at 1365 (“His-
torically, and as a matter of law, corporate managements have been required to run their 
affairs in the interests of their security holders.”). 
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only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest ap-
pears.”35 Dodd disagreed with this assessment.36 He contended that 
corporations have a much larger constituency to whom their duties are 
owed, including, inter alia, shareholder interests,37 the interests of cor-
porate employees,38 and broader social goals.39 The rationale for this 
broader constituency was premised upon his assertion that corporate 
managers “are guardians of all the interests which the corporation af-
fects and not merely servants of its absentee owners.” 40 
 Although in later years Berle conceded that Dodd’s broader vision 
of the scope of the responsibilities of commercial enterprise—as well as 
that of management’s duties—had prevailed over his own,41 the debate 
over their formerly entrenched positions persisted. The debate be-
tween Berle and Dodd foreshadowed the contemporary controversy as 
to the proper beneficiaries of management’s duties. This modern-day 
debate pits shareholder primacy model advocates against progressives 
championing a broader constituency to whom management’s duties 
are owed.42 This “broader constituency” may include any or all of 
                                                                                                                      
35 Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, supra note 6, at 1049. 
36 Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 
supra note 6, at 205 (“The proposition that the sole function of business organizations is to 
produce the maximum profit for absentee owners is not only one which cannot, in the 
nature of things, appeal strongly as a code of professional ethics to the managers; it is also 
one which no longer appeals strongly to the community as a social policy.”). 
37 Berle, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, supra note 6, at 1152 (“It may, how-
ever, be forcibly urged that all these and other past, present, and possible future limita-
tions on the pursuit of stockholder profit in no way alter the theory that the sole function 
of directors and other corporate managers is to seek to obtain the maximum amount of 
profits for the stockholders as owners of the enterprise.”). 
38 Id. at 1151–52. Berle asserts that “managers . . . may easily come to feel as strong a 
community of interest with their fellow workers as with a group of investors whose only 
connection with the enterprise is that they or their predecessors in title invested money in 
it . . . .” Id. at 1157. 
39 Id. at 1153–57, 1161. 
40 Id. at 1157. Berle explains: 
If we think of [the corporation] as an institution which differs in the nature 
of things from the individuals who compose it[,] . . . [the corporation] is af-
fected not only by the laws which regulate business but by the attitude of pub-
lic and business opinion as to the social obligations of business. 
Id. at 1161. 
41 See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 169 (9th prtg. 
1954); Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Decision Making and Social Control, 24 Bus. Law. 149, 150 
(1968); see also A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate 
Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 33, 37 n.14 (1991); Joseph T. Walsh, The Fidu-
ciary Foundation of Corporate Law, 27 J. Corp. L. 333, 335 (2002). 
42 See Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 Hastings Bus. L.J. 89, 91 
(2005) (“For most people honestly wrestling with issues of corporate governance, however, 
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shareholders, bondholders, general creditors, employees, and social 
interests at large.43 
 Despite the fact that the foundational debate over corporate pur-
pose has ebbed and flowed over the years, shareholder primacy theo-
rists and progressives have continued to jockey for position and influ-
ence. This struggle is evidenced through the writings of an ever-
changing list of corporate law commentators, statutory reforms, and 
jurisprudential developments.44 Thus, the classic Berle and Dodd de-
bate over corporate governance remains alive and well. Even Hans-
mann, in revisiting The End of History for Corporate Law some eight years 
later, admitted that the paper “was written to capture, a bit provoca-
tively, a particular perspective in a debate on convergence in corporate 
law that was just then gathering steam.”45 Hansmann conceded that 
“[t]here will probably never be perfect homogeneity in the approaches 
taken to these issues.”46
 
Arguably, the same conclusion is equally appro-
                                                                                                                      
shareholder primacy is not the foundational assumption but rather one of the potential 
conclusions. . . . [O]ther potential conclusions exist as well.”). 
43 See generally Progressive Corporate Law 37–59 (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995) 
(discussing various challenges to the prevailing shareholder primacy and shareholder 
wealth maximization views). Although a discussion of corporate social responsibility is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it directly affects the fiduciary characterization of corpo-
rate bodies and the obligations that result from that characterization. The idea that private 
corporations have responsibilities to the public at large, for example, has a direct impact 
on corporations’ duties of disclosure and their method of reporting their financial affairs, 
as well as the level of detail that ought to be required. Indeed, as Justice J.T. Walsh sug-
gests, recent corporate scandals, such as the collapse of energy giant Enron Corp. as a 
result of faulty or misleading financial reporting, “may cause us to reexamine our tradi-
tional notions of the public responsibility of private corporations and, in particular, to 
whom corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure.” Walsh, supra note 41, at 339. 
44 See Mitchell, supra note 13, at 3; Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 300–01; Dallas, su-
pra note 13, at 217; Greenfield & Smith, supra note 13, at 965–66; Johnson, supra note 13, 
at 1716–17 (1993); Millon, supra note 13, at 1376–77. 
45 Henry Hansmann, How Close Is the End of History?, 31 J. Corp. L. 745, 745, 749 
(2006) (stating that one’s faith in reaching the end of history for corporate law may be 
closely tied to one’s faith in achieving Fukuyama’s original End of History in politics). Curi-
ously, Hansmann’s commentary could be seen to parallel that expressed in Francis Fuku-
yama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992), which served as the inspiration 
for the title of Hansmann and Kraakman’s article, The End of History for Corporate Law. See 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 439. Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Fu-
ture: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2002), qualifies Fukuyama’s 
original “end of history” thesis, much like Hansmann may be seen to have qualified the 
strength of the original “end of history for corporate law” prediction that he and Kraak-
man made in 2001. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 439. 
46 Hansmann, supra note 45, at 750. 
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priate to Hansmann and Kraakman’s assertion of the end of history for 
corporate law itself.47 
II. Analysis 
A. Debunking U.S. Corporate Law Foundations of the “End of History” Thesis 
 Despite claims of the “end of history” of corporate law or asser-
tions that U.S. corporate law was the subject of a successful hostile 
takeover by shareholder primacy theory, it is not clear that U.S. law 
wholly ascribes to the shareholder primacy norm. Blair and Stout have 
shown that “a series of mid- and late-twentieth-century cases . . . have 
allowed directors to sacrifice shareholders’ profits to stakeholders’ in-
terests when necessary for the best interests of ‘the corporation.’”48
 
As 
evidenced in the cases that follow, U.S. corporate law jurisprudence 
would appear to be far more muted in its support of shareholder pri-
macy and shareholder wealth-maximization arguments than Hansmann 
and Kraakman or Bainbridge have suggested. 
1. Dodge v. Ford (1919):49 More than Meets the Eye 
 A closer examination of the landmark 1919 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 
case,50
 
which has long been associated with the idea of shareholder 
primacy, indicates that the decision shares more in common with pro-
                                                                                                                      
47 See id. (“[I]t might be said that this leaves most of the important and interesting de-
bates within corporate law today untouched by our thesis. And, admittedly, that’s not an 
unreasonable thing to say.”). 
48 Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, 
N.V. v. Pathe Comm. Corp., 1991 WL 277613, at *2–4 (Del. Ch. 1991) (avoiding risky un-
dertakings benefitting shareholders at creditors’ expense); Theodora Holding Corp. v. 
Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (sanctioning directors’ decision to use cor-
porate funds for charitable purposes); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1968) (rejecting business strategies to increase profits having potential detrimental 
effects on local community); Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 303–04 (1999) (citing Para-
mount Comm., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989) (warding off hostile 
takeover bids at a premium to insulate employee or community interests). Blair and Stout 
contend that not only do these examples demonstrate that “modern corporate law does 
not adhere to the norm of shareholder primacy,” but “case law interpreting the business 
judgment rule often explicitly authorizes directors to sacrifice shareholders’ interests to 
protect other constituencies.” Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 303; see also Greenfield, supra 
note 42, at 114–17, (citing Prod. Res. Group LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 787 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that “directors are not required to put aside any consideration of 
other constituencies . . . when deciding how to manage the firm”)). 
49 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
50 Id. 
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gressive analyses of corporate law than with Hansmann and Kraakman’s 
“end of history” claim. In particular, the noted Dodge v. Ford judgment, 
long considered to be the beacon for shareholder primacy advocates,51 
is not as absolutely dedicated to the advancement of shareholder 
wealth maximization as observers have generally posited. Dodge v. Ford is 
far more complicated and nuanced than most corporate law scholars 
have tended to suggest.52 Thus, although even noted progressive schol-
ars have conceded that the judgment in Dodge v. Ford ran roughshod 
over broader notions of stakeholder protection as the basis of corpo-
rate function,53 a thorough analysis suggests that they may well have 
given their concessions too freely. 
 In Dodge v. Ford, the Dodge brothers, holders of 10% of the shares 
of Ford Motor Co. (FMC), commenced a lawsuit against FMC’s man-
agement for its failure to distribute an appropriate amount of FMC’s 
earnings to its shareholders.54 At the time, FMC was a hugely successful 
enterprise.55 It held property and receivables in the amount of some 
$78 million as of July 1916, as well as $54 million in cash or cash equiva-
lents.56 In addition, FMC had paid some $41 million in special divi-
dends to its shareholders between December 1911 and October 1915, 
on top of the $1.2 million that it paid annually in regular dividends.57 
 In November 1916, FMC declared a special dividend of $2 mil-
lion.58 FMC’s board of directors subsequently decided to cease paying 
such large special dividends to shareholders and instead use the bulk of 
FMC’s profits for other purposes.59 The directors sought to use some of 
FMC’s profits to construct a smelter and steel manufacturing plant to 
produce steel for car production, as well as to create a new, state-of-the-
art manufacturing facility.60 Moreover, FMC’s directors decided to con-
                                                                                                                      
51 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 1423–24 (1993). 
52 See 170 N.W. at 685. 
53 See e.g., Millon, supra note 31, at 223–25. 
54 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 673. 
55 Id. at 670. For the year ending July 31, 1916, FMC profits were just shy of $60 mil-
lion, and its accumulated profits were approximately $174 million. Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670. This included construction of FMC’s Rouge River manufac-
turing facility, which would eventually produce 4,000 cars a day, would employ over 
100,000 workers, and would be “the largest manufacturing facility built until then or 
since.” M. Todd Henderson, Everything Old Is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Company 30 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 373, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070284. 
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tinue the corporation’s longstanding policy of manufacturing cars at a 
lower cost by reducing the unit price of its vehicles from $440 to $360.61 
 The Dodge brothers regarded these plans as designed “to con-
tinue the corporation henceforth as a semi-eleemosynary [charitable] 
institution and not as a business institution.”62 They sought a special 
dividend of not less than 75% of FMC’s accumulated cash surplus,63 
injunctions to prevent the construction of the smelter and manufactur-
ing facilities, and the reduction in the per-unit cost of Ford cars.64 
 Henry Ford, chairman and founder of FMC, as well as the owner 
of 58% of FMC shares, maintained that FMC had a responsibility to 
benefit the general public, and that the plans were consistent with that 
responsibility.65 When questioned about his stance at trial, Ford main-
tained that FMC took into consideration a wide range of stakeholder 
interests, not only the interests of its shareholders.66 During the pro-
ceedings, when asked for what purpose besides profit-making FMC was 
organized, Ford replied, “[FMC is] [o]rganized to do as much good as 
we can, everywhere, for everybody concerned . . . [a]nd incidentally to 
make money.”67 Ultimately, the Dodge brothers’ suit was successful at 
trial.68 The trial court ordered the declaration of a dividend in excess of 
$19 million and granted an injunction to halt construction of new 
manufacturing and smelting facilities.69 The decision to reduce the 
price of Ford vehicles was upheld.70 
 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that FMC’s 
plan and spending 
[did] not call for and [was] not intended to produce immedi-
ately a more profitable business but a less profitable one; not 
only less profitable than formerly but less profitable than it 
                                                                                                                      
61 The per-unit cost of Ford vehicles had decreased from an initial cost in excess of 
$900 to a cost of $440 in July, 1916, with a plan to further reduce it to $360 beginning Au-
gust 1, 1916. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670. 
62 Id. at 683. 
63 Id. at 673. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 684. 
66 See id. 
67 Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’ Fiduciary 
Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
409, 436 (2002) (quoting Henry Ford). 
69 See Dodge., 170 N.W. at 677. 
70 See id. at 677–78. 
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[was] admitted it might [have been] made. The apparent 
immediate effect [would] be to diminish the value of shares 
and the returns to shareholders.71 
The court further found that “certain sentiments, philanthropic and 
altruistic, creditable to Mr. Ford, had large influence in determining 
the policy to be pursued by the Ford Motor Company . . . .” 72 
 Notwithstanding the FMC board’s determination that the best in-
terests of the corporation were served by eliminating the large special 
dividends and reinvesting profits in the business, the court stated that 
“[t]here should [have been] no confusion (of which there was evi-
dence) of the duties which Mr. Ford conceive[d] that he and the stock-
holders owe[d] to the general public and the duties which in law he and 
his codirectors owe[d] to protesting, minority shareholders.”73 The 
court then famously distilled its vision of the essential purpose of the for-
profit corporation: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors 
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is 
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction 
of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stock-
holders in order to devote them to other purposes.74 
The court also held that courts may interfere with business decisions 
where profit maximization is not the primary motivation of directors.75 
 These conclusions have been used to support the notion that 
Dodge v. Ford is properly viewed as supporting the shareholder primacy 
model of corporate governance.76 If this was all that the Michigan Su-
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. at 683. 
72 Id. at 684. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. The court explained: 
[I]t is not within the lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and con-
duct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of share-
holders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others, and no one will 
contend that, if the avowed purpose of the defendant directors was to sacri-
fice the interests of shareholders, it would not be the duty of the courts to in-
terfere. 
Id. 
76 See id. 
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preme Court had said, then such a conclusion would be logical.77 The 
court did not stop there, however. While it ordered the payment of sig-
nificant dividends against the wishes of FMC’s directors,78 it also vacated 
the injunction imposed by the trial court on the construction of FMC’s 
new manufacturing and smelting facilities. Further, the court did not 
enjoin the corporation’s plan to lower the price of its vehicles from 
$440 to $360, even though that action would have reduced FMC’s sales 
figures by a minimum of $48 million in the first year alone.79 As the 
court explained, “[i]t is recognized that plans must often be made for a 
long future, for expected competition, for a continuing as well as im-
mediately profitable venture.” 80 
 The decision of FMC’s board to invest in infrastructure develop-
ment and to reduce the price of its vehicles cannot be properly assessed 
outside of the context in which those decisions were made.81 FMC had 
faced significantly increased competition during the period in ques-
tion. The previously volatile automobile manufacturing industry that 
had been characterized by numerous small, independent operators 
who generally manufactured modest numbers of vehicles had become 
dominated by larger and more sophisticated corporations. The Dodge 
brothers themselves began manufacturing their own complete auto-
mobiles in 1914 in competition with FMC. General Motors Corporation 
(GMC) was formed in 1908 by the merging of the Buick and Oldsmo-
bile companies, expanded in 1909 by adding the Oakland Motor Com-
pany (later Pontiac) and Cadillac, and was merged with the Chevrolet 
Motor Company in 1916.82 Consequently, it was prudent for the direc-
tors of FMC to seek to entrench or improve FMC’s position in the au-
tomotive market, as well as to attempt to impede competitors’ inroads 
into their market share, which would reduce FMC’s long-term profit-
ability.83
 
Thus, in order to sustain the level of profits earned prior to 
                                                                                                                      
77 See id. at 683. 
78 Id. (doing so on the basis that the board’s refusal to pay special dividends “ap-
pear[ed] to be not an exercise of discretion on the part of the directors, but an arbitrary 
refusal to do what the circumstances required to be done”). 
79 See id. at 683–85 (basing estimates on FMC’s annual production capacity of 600,000 
cars, not reflecting increase in manufacturing capacity anticipated by $24 million infra-
structure enhancement plan). 
80 Id. at 684. 
81 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683–84. 
82 General Motors, Corporate Information, History, http://www.gm.com/corporate/ 
about/history (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
83 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical 
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 602 (1992) (sug-
gesting that “[h]ad Ford testified to a desire to restrain the Dodges’ competition, rather 
 
234 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 33:219 
1916 and the market position of the company, FMC’s board of directors 
looked beyond the immediate satisfaction of its shareholders.84 
 In addition to the infrastructure improvements and price reduc-
tions designed to ensure FMC’s competitiveness, the benefits that FMC 
conferred on other stakeholders, such as employees and the public at 
large, were not entirely selfless, but ultimately enured to FMC’s bene-
fit.85 Such actions were, therefore, consistent with the fulfillment of di-
rectors’ fiduciary duties owed to their corporations.86 Increased wages 
for employees, notably in the form of the “five-dollar-day,” brought 
more potential customers for Ford vehicles,87 especially when the loy-
alty and pride of employees—particularly extant in the automotive sec-
tor—is considered. Similarly, reducing the price of Ford vehicles al-
lowed more people to purchase Ford cars.88 Although this strategy 
might have resulted in less profit per vehicle, it was designed to create 
greater long-term profitability because of the larger volume of vehicles 
sold and the reduction in the costs of production envisaged by FMC’s 
infrastructure plan.89 
 By not requiring FMC to abandon its infrastructure improvement 
and vehicle cost reduction plans, even though the former considerably 
reduced firm cash reserves and the latter had the effect of significantly 
reducing profits, the court deferred to the business judgment exercised 
by FMC’s board.90 In doing so, the court effectively sanctioned its ability 
to not only look beyond immediate shareholder interests, but to ignore 
those interests in favor of broader objectives.91 Therefore, Dodge v. Ford is 
                                                                                                                      
than to his expressed altruism, the case might not have been about corporate purpose at 
all, but about directorial self-dealing”). 
84 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
85 See id. at 683. 
86 See id. at 683–84. 
87 The company’s financial statement for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1916 showed 
36,626 employees earning at least five dollars a day. Id. at 670. To put this into perspective, 
the five-dollar-a-day wage more than doubled the previous wage when the one-hour reduc-
tion in the length of the work day is factored into the equation. See Mich. Dep’t of Natu-
ral Res. & Env’t, The Assembly Line and the $5 Day, Background Reading (2003), 
http://www.michigan.gov/dnr (search article title; follow hyperlink). At the time that 
Ford introduced its five-dollar-day in 1914, the average daily wage of factory workers was 
one dollar a day. See The Museum of Am. Heritage, A Sense of Wonder: The 1915 San 
Francisco World’s Fair, June 7, 2002–Sept. 22, 2002 (2003), http://www.moah.org/ 
exhibits/archives/1915. 
88 See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. 
89 See id. at 683–84. 
90 Id. at 684. 
91 See id. In any event, it is difficult to accept that shareholders’ interests were being ig-
nored when they had received some $41 million in special dividends between December 
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inconsistent with the shareholder primacy norm that it is generally said 
to represent.92 Indeed, although Dodge v. Ford is often juxtaposed against 
cases such as Shlensky v. Wrigley,93 which emphasize broader, communi-
tarian interests, the decision is, in fact, more consistent with the view 
articulated in Shlensky than it is with the pro-shareholder primacy model. 
2. Shlensky v. Wrigley (1968): Shareholder Primacy Strikes Out 
 Shlensky v. Wrigley 94 represents another prominent case that rejects 
the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance.95 Shlensky 
was a minority shareholder of the Chicago National League Ball Club, 
Inc. (CNLBC), which operated the Chicago Cubs professional baseball 
team.96 He sued the directors of CNLBC for refusing to install lights in 
Wrigley Field, the Cubs’ home ballpark, in order to allow for night 
baseball games.97 From 1961 to 1965, the Cubs had sustained operating 
losses from their baseball operations.98 Shlensky maintained that the 
                                                                                                                      
1911 and October 1915, and their long-term interests, which were intricately tied with 
those of FMC, were being attended to via the infrastructure improvement plan. See id. at 
670. 
92 See id. at 684; see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733, 775 (2005) (“So even Dodge, the high-water mark for the supposed duty 
to profit-maximize, indicates that no such enforceable duty exists. Nor does there appear 
to be any other case that has ever actually restrained a management decision to sacrifice 
corporate profits in the public interest.”); Henderson, supra note 60, at 34 (“The Dodge 
case is often misread or mistaught as setting a legal rule of shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion. This was not and is not the law.”); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. 
Ford, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 163, 166 (2008) (“Dodge v. Ford is indeed bad law, at least when 
cited for the proposition that the corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing share-
holder wealth. Dodge v. Ford is a mistake, a judicial ‘sport,’ a doctrinal oddity largely irrele-
vant to corporate law and corporate practice.”). 
93 Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 787; Theodora, 257 A.2d at 398; Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d 776, 
780–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684; Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 303. 
94 237 N.E.2d at 776. 
95 Id. at 780–81. 
96 Id. at 777. 
97 Id. At the time of the Shlensky decision, Wrigley Field was the only stadium in Major 
League Baseball that was not equipped for night games, having remained so long after all 
other teams had outfitted their ballparks for night baseball. Baseball Almanac, Famous 
First Night Games, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/firsts/first10.shtml (last visited Apr. 
25, 2010). Night baseball was first played in 1935 in Cincinnati’s Crosley Field and was 
played in every major league ballpark by the late 1960s, with subsequent expansion teams 
beginning night baseball immediately upon joining Major League Baseball. See id. 
98 Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 777. 
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lack of night baseball games diminished the value of the company and 
its shares by reducing its profitability.99 
 Shlensky alleged that Philip K. Wrigley, President of CNLBC and 
holder of approximately 80% of its shares, had admitted that he was un-
concerned whether the Cubs would become more profitable if they 
played night games.100 Wrigley’s reluctance to retrofit his ballpark with 
lights was said to have stemmed from his belief “that baseball [was] a 
‘daytime sport’ and that the installation of lights and night baseball 
games w[ould] have a deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neigh-
borhood.”101 Shlensky charged that the other directors of CNLBC ac-
quiesced in the policy Wrigley had dictated, that the policy clearly con-
cerned matters other than maximizing shareholder value, and that the 
directors’ “arbitrary and capricious acts constitute[d] mismanagement 
and waste of corporate assets.”102 
 The Illinois Court of Appeal rejected Shlensky’s allegations and 
determined that the directors’ decision to not play night games was, in 
fact, consistent with their duties owed to CNLBC.103 The court con-
cluded that the directors need not have the corporation engage in the 
most immediately profitable course of action, but could base their deci-
sions on the longer-term interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers.104 The court agreed with the defendant’s claim that the scheduling 
of night games could result in the deterioration of the surrounding 
neighborhood, which might reduce the long-term profitability of the 
corporation and detrimentally affect share value.105 In dismissing the 
suit, the court deferred to the directors’ exercise of their business judg-
ment. As the court stated: 
                                                                                                                      
99 Id. This lack of profitability is arguably not solely attributable to the absence of night 
baseball, but also to the fact that the Cubs finished seventh twice, eighth twice, and ninth 
once between 1961 and 1965. Id. 
100 Id. at 778. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 780. 
104 Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780. 
105 Id. Interestingly, in 1988, lights were installed at Wrigley Field, and night baseball is 
now a regular event at the stadium. Not only has the surrounding neighborhood not deterio-
rated as a result, but it has experienced a resurgence with the addition of new businesses 
tapping into the increased attendance generated by the ballpark. Peak attendance at Wrigley 
Field before the introduction of night baseball came in 1985, when 2,161,534 fans attended 
baseball games. In the first full year of night baseball in 1989, 2,491,942 fans were in atten-
dance, while attendance since 1998 has consistently been in excess of 2.6 million (and in 
excess of the National League’s average attendance), reaching a peak of 3.3 million in the 
2008 season. Baseball Almanac, Chicago Cubs Attendance Records, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/teams/cubsatte.shtml (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
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[W]e do not mean to say that we have decided that the deci-
sion of the directors was a correct one. That is beyond our ju-
risdiction and ability. We are merely saying that the decision is 
one properly before directors and the motives alleged . . . 
showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in their mak-
ing of that decision.106 
The court’s words thus served as yet another clear invalidation of the 
shareholder primacy model. 
3. U.S. Corporate Law Jurisprudence in the 1980s: A Shaky Foundation 
for the “End of History Claim” 
a. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp. (1985):107 The “Corporate Enteprise” 
Above All 
 The shareholder primacy model did not achieve much traction, if 
any, in U.S. corporate law jurisprudence in the 1980s. For example, 
1985 yielded one of the clearest examples of the subordination or rejec-
tion of the model. The landmark case Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co. con-
cerned the actions of Unocal’s board of directors in resisting a hostile 
takeover bid by Mesa.108 Unocal’s board alleged that this bid would have 
been detrimental to the corporation.109 The Delaware Supreme Court 
explicitly recognized the potential for a conflict of interest where a sit-
ting board was in a position to thwart a takeover bid.110 In such a cir-
cumstance, directors might be tempted to resist a takeover bid solely to 
maintain their incumbency.111 Directors’ ability to resist a takeover bid 
through defensive tactics designed to solidify their positions created at 
least the possibility that directors might choose to favor their own inter-
ests over those of a corporation’s shareholders and over those of other 
stakeholders.112 
 As the potential for this type of action posed a significant risk to 
stakeholder—and especially shareholder—interests, the Unocal court 
held that the actions of directors in opposing a hostile takeover would 
be subjected to an increased level of scrutiny beyond the more relaxed 
                                                                                                                      
106 Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780. 
107 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
108 Id. at 955–56. 
109 Id. at 953. 
110 Id. at 955. 
111 Id. 
112 See id.; see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995). 
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business judgment standard.113 Directors in such circumstances would 
be required to demonstrate that their actions were precipitated by their 
belief that a threat to the corporation as an entity existed, and that their 
defensive tactics were reasonable in relation to the perceived threat.114 
 This response by the Unocal court marked a significant departure 
from existing Delaware jurisprudence, which tended to defer to direc-
tors’ exercise of business judgment.115 In the process of protecting 
against directorial self-interest, the Unocal decision created an entirely 
different effect by sanctioning the idea that a board of directors had to 
consider the impact of a takeover bid on “the corporate enterprise.”116 
In particular, the court determined that, in the context of ascertaining 
whether a threat to a corporation existed, which was necessary in order 
to claim the protection of the business judgment rule in resisting a hos-
tile takeover bid, directors could consider “the impact on . . . creditors, 
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally.”117 
This conclusion, although perhaps necessary to curb director conflicts 
of interest, subordinates the shareholder primacy model to the con-
stituency model of the corporate form.118 
b. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (1986):119 Dem-
onstrating the Limitations of the Shareholder Primacy Model 
 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,120 like Dodge v. 
Ford, appears to be a case that affirms the shareholder primacy mod-
el.121 Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the case reveals its limitations 
for supporting shareholder primacy in a manner similar to Dodge.122 
 In Revlon, the corporation’s directors engaged in defensive tactics 
to forestall a hostile takeover bid and instead negotiated the sale of the 
company to a friendly buyer at a lower price.123 Part of the rationale for 
choosing the friendly bid was a desire to protect certain creditors’ in-
                                                                                                                      
113 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
114 Id. at 955. 
115 Mitchell, supra note 83, at 611 (“The Unocal court . . . follow[ed] a conceptual ap-
proach quite at odds with the acknowledged formalism of Delaware corporate jurispru-
dence.”). 
116 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955–56. 
117 Id. at 955. 
118 Id. 
119 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 182; Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
122 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180–83; Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
123 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176–79. 
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terests.124 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors had 
wrongfully engaged in selective dealing to stave off the hostile bidder 
when “obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders 
should have been the central theme guiding director action.”125 The 
court determined that once the break-up of Revlon was inevitable, 
[t]he duty of the board . . . changed from the preservation of 
Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the com-
pany’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit. . . . The di-
rectors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion 
to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company.126 
Subsequently, the directors were found to have breached their duties of 
care to the shareholders for failing to maximize the value of their share 
holdings.127 
 This shift in director duties became known as “Revlon duties.”128 
Thus, where the break-up of a company becomes inevitable, the direc-
tors’ duties,129 which are normally owed to the corporation, shift to its 
shareholders and become focused on the sole purpose of maximizing 
shareholder value.130 The holding in Revlon was subsequently clarified 
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
Time Inc.131 and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network.132 Nev-
                                                                                                                      
124 Id. Additionally, the white knight in Revlon had agreed to allow the incumbent 
management to operate the company, subject to its agreement to sell off certain divisions 
and to remain capable of servicing its debts. Id. at 178–79. 
125 Id. at 182. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 185. 
128 See id. at 182. 
129 Curiously, although the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Revlon directors 
had breached their duties of care to the shareholders, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
had found that the directors had breached their duties of loyalty. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch. 1985). Even in the Supreme 
Court’s judgment, it confused the matter, first stating that the Court of Chancery had 
found that the directors had breached their duties of care and subsequently characterizing 
the Chancery Court’s finding as one of a breach of duty of loyalty. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175–
76, 179. The Delaware Supreme Court’s haphazard characterization seems to be the sim-
ple result of carelessness rather than having any substantive reason. See id. 
130 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
131 See 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). The court determined that there were gener-
ally two circumstances that resulted in Revlon-type duties, both of which focused on the 
break-up of the target: when “a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to 
sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company” 
or when “in response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks 
an alternative transaction involving the breakup of the company.” Id. 
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ertheless, dissecting the logic of the shift required by the Revlon duties 
reveals that the shift is inconsistent with the shareholder primacy model 
of corporate governance.133 The Revlon duty shift required that the fi-
duciary duty of directors become a duty to maximize shareholder val-
ue.134 Shareholder primacy theory interprets the normal operation of 
directors’ fiduciary duties as being primarily aimed at benefitting 
shareholders.135 Yet, if the duty in Revlon results in a shift in directors’ 
focus toward shareholder interests from that which it usually is, the in-
dication is that the duties owed under non-Revlon circumstances (i.e. 
“normal” or “usual” circumstances) would not be directed toward the 
shareholders’ benefit.136 In this sense, Revlon appears inconsistent with 
the shareholder primacy model.137 
 If directors’ usual fiduciary duty is not owed to shareholders, as a 
logical construction of the Revlon judgment would indicate, then the 
judgment is both inconsistent with shareholder primacy theory and 
brings Hansmann and Kraakman’s assertion of the “end of history” for 
corporate law into question.138 It also provides an interesting twist on 
Stout’s contention that “Revlon thus defines the one context in which 
Delaware law mandates shareholder primacy.”139 Using the logic above, 
Stout’s contention would dictate that shareholder primacy is only man-
dated when there is a required shift in directors’ fiduciary duties, as the 
Revlon precedent requires.140 Although this outcome is not consistent 
                                                                                                                      
132 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994). In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that it 
was not necessary for an inevitable break-up of the corporation to occur before Revlon-type 
duties were triggered; the key to the application of those duties was the pending sale of 
corporate control. Id. at 37. Thus, the court concluded that directors owed fiduciary duties 
to maximize shareholder value where a corporation engaged in a transaction that either 
caused a change in corporate control or resulted in the break-up of the corporation. Id. at 
47–48. 
133 Although the existence of Revlon duties may have been weakened by subsequent 
developments, this does not affect the impact of those shifting duties on Hansmann and 
Kraakman’s assertion of the triumph of the shareholder primacy model. See, e.g., Sean J. 
Griffiths, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 
Duke L.J. 1, 66–67 (2005); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Pri-
macy, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1189, 1204 (2002). 
134 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
135 Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trusts, supra note 6, at 1049. 
136 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. 
137 See id.; Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trusts, supra note 6, at 1049. 
138 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trusts, supra note 6, at 
1049; Hansmann & Kraakmann, supra note 1, at 468. 
139 Stout, supra note 133, at 1204. 
140 See id. 
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with Stout’s original meaning, she would likely find it a preferable basis 
for arguing against shareholder primacy theory.141 
c. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. (1989):142 Reaffirming 
the Primacy of the Corporate Entity 
 The 1989 case Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. further 
questions the legitimacy of Hansmann and Kraakman’s shareholder 
primacy claim. 143 In that case, Time Inc. (Time), which had already ap-
proved a merger with Warner Communications Inc. (Warner), became 
the target of a surprise takeover bid by Paramount Communications, 
Inc. (Paramount).144 Time resisted Paramount’s bid on the basis that it 
posed a threat to Time’s control over its own destiny and long-term wel-
fare.145 Time’s management contended that the merger with Warner 
would allow Time to retain its control and culture. It acknowledged, 
however, that the deal would result in Time’s shareholders becoming 
minority shareholders in the newly-merged company and would saddle 
the company with significant debt.146 The Delaware Supreme Court ac-
cepted Time’s arguments and denied Paramount’s request for an in-
junction to halt Time’s merger with Warner.147 
 The judgment in Paramount allowed Time’s directors to refuse to 
put Paramount’s tender offer to a shareholder vote, even though the 
offer would have maximized shareholder value, because Time’s direc-
tors deemed the sale to Paramount to be against Time’s best inter-
ests.148 Time’s management asserted that the sale of Time to Para-
mount would have meant the sacrifice of Time’s control over its future, 
as well as the distinct “Time Culture” of “journalistic integrity” that had 
been built up within the corporation’s operations.149 
 The most important element of Paramount, for present purposes, is 
the court’s acceptance that the interests of the Time Corporation as an 
entity, or the interests of the corporation’s employees, are to be re-
garded as paramount over the interests of any particular corporate 
                                                                                                                      
141 See id. 
142  571 A.2d at 1140. 
143 See id. at 1150. 
144 Id. at 1146–47. 
145 Id. at 1148. 
146 Id. at 1153. 
147 Id. at 1154–55. 
148 Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1148. 
149 Id. 
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stakeholder, including shareholders.150 In this sense, the judgment is 
inconsistent with the position Hansmann and Kraakman advanced.151 As 
Professor Allen has stated, Paramount “might be interpreted as constitut-
ing implicit judicial acknowledgement of the social entity conception 
[of the corporation],” as clearly as Dodge reflects the alternative property 
conception of the corporation.152 
B. Canadian Corporate Law and the “End of History” Claim 
1. A Comparison of U.S. and Canadian Characterizations of Corporate 
Governance 
 In comparing U.S. and Canadian characterizations of corporate 
governance, some obvious distinctions between the jurisdictions ought 
to be noted. First, share ownership in Canadian corporations has his-
torically been far more concentrated than that existing in U.S. corpora-
tions. Second, the duties and restrictions imposed on Canadian corpo-
rate management appear more onerous than those established by U.S. 
law. It might be said that the breadth of management’s duties in Can-
ada is justified because of a greater need to prevent Canadian corpo-
rate management from having its duties to the corporation be 
corrupted or improperly influenced by more concentrated voting 
rights or financial might. There are other potential explanations of this 
situation, however. 
 Despite the fact that greater concentrations of share ownership 
could justify the broader and more onerous regulation of Canadian 
corporate management activity, this increased oversight could also be 
explained by another significant distinction: the more pervasive gov-
ernmental regulation of private relations in Canada than what gener-
ally exists in the United States. The enhanced scrutiny given to private 
interactions by Canadian governmental bodies has profound effects on 
Canadian corporate law. Additionally, increased concentrations of fi-
nancial power and influence in Canada could lead to the existence of 
greater conflicts of interest,153 which could also rationalize the need for 
                                                                                                                      
150 Id. at 1154–55. 
151 See Hansmann & Kraakmann, supra note 1, at 468. 
152 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684–85; William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Busi-
ness Corporation, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 261, 276 (1992). 
153 Indeed, fewer investors and lenders could easily translate into more incestuous re-
lations in the Canadian corporate realm than those existing in the United States. Histori-
cally, this has been the norm; however, increased globalization potentially results in re-
duced concentrations of investment and more widespread financial dealings between 
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stronger regulation of corporate management.154 Although these mat-
ters will not be discussed directly herein, they provide a context for ap-
preciating the comparisons that do appear below. 
 As indicated above, it is unclear why explicit discussion of corpo-
rate purpose was far less noticeable in Canadian corporate law than it 
was in the United States until quite recently. This situation changed, 
however, with the Canadian Supreme Court’s judgment in Peoples De-
partment Stores Inc. v. Wise.155
 
Peoples was the first modern Canadian case 
to expressly discuss management’s duties in corporate governance. It 
also generated a wealth of commentary, the breadth of which was as 
new to Canadian law as the character of the Peoples decision itself.156 
The Canadian Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in BCE Inc. v. 1976 
Debentureholders157 provided an opportunity for the court to clarify and 
amplify some of the principles that it had established in Peoples. 
 Before venturing into a discussion of the Peoples and BCE Inc. cases, 
a preliminary note on Canadian corporate law is appropriate. Canadian 
corporate law shares certain commonalities with U.S. law, but draws 
upon both British and U.S. corporate principles, which it combines 
with some unique innovations of its own. Unlike U.S. corporate law, 
Canadian corporate law falls under both federal and provincial jurisdic-
tion.158 Additionally, unlike the United States, where the state of Dela-
                                                                                                                      
Canadian corporations, institutional investors, and lenders (subject, of course, to any re-
strictions on corporate share ownership that may exist via governmental regulation, as for 
example in the situation that exists with regard to Canadian chartered banks). 
154 See Deborah A. DeMott, Oppressed but Not Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment of Cana-
dian Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Other Corporate Constituents, 56 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 181, 221–22 (2002). 
155 See [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 477, 489–93 (Can.). 
156 See generally Catherine Francis, Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise: The Ex-
panded Scope of Directors’ and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duties of Care, 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 175 
(2005); Wayne D. Gray, A Solicitor’s Perspective on Peoples v. Wise, 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 184 
(2005); Wayne D. Gray, Peoples v. Wise and Dylex: Identifying Shareholder Interests Upon or 
Near Corporate Insolvency—Stasis or Pragmatism?, 39 Can. Bus. L.J. 242 (2003); Warren Grov-
er, The Tangled Web of the Wise Case, 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 200 (2005); Mohamed F. Khimji, 
Peoples v. Wise—Conflating Directors’ Duties, Oppression, and Stakeholder Protection, 39 U.B.C. 
L. Rev. 209 (2006); Ian B. Lee, Peoples Department Stores v. Wise and “The Best Interests of 
the Corporation,” 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 212 (2005); Darcy L. MacPherson, The Supreme Court 
Restates Directors’ Fiduciary Duty—A Comment on Peoples Department Stores v. Wise, 43 Alta. 
L. Rev. 383 (2005); Stephane Rousseau, Directors’ Duty of Care After Peoples: Would It Be Wise 
to Start Worrying About Liability?, 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 223 (2005); Jacob S. Ziegel, The Peoples 
Judgment and the Supreme Court’s Role in Private Law Cases, 41 Can. Bus. L.J. 236 (2005). 
157 See BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 584–85 (Can.). 
158 See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5, 
§§ 91, 92(11) (Appendix II 1985); Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 
161, 174–75 (Can.). See generally Leonard I. Rotman, Constitutional Interpretation: The Appli-
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ware is readily acknowledged as the primary source of domestic corpo-
rate law,159 there is no undisputed jurisdictional leader in Canadian 
corporate law. For this reason, corporate law decisions of the Canadian 
Supreme Court, although few and far between, hold particular promi-
nence in Canadian corporate law. 
 The Peoples and BCE Inc. judgments advance the broader under-
standing of corporate purpose and the function of corporate manage-
ment that is suggested by the structure of most Canadian corporate law 
statutes. This is particularly evidenced by the physical and conceptual 
separation of management’s fiduciary duties from its duty of care, the 
broader range of individuals granted standing to bring derivative ac-
tions on behalf of corporations in Canada than in the United States, 
and the existence of a statutory oppression remedy that provides sig-
nificant relief for a broad range of aggrieved corporate stakeholders. 
2. Rejection of the Shareholder Primacy Model in Canadian Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence 
a. Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise (2004):160 Management Owes 
Fiduciary Duties to the Corporation 
 The Peoples case concerned corporate management’s duties to 
creditors upon or in the vicinity of corporate insolvency. Unlike the ju-
risprudence in other countries, including Australia,161 New Zealand,162 
the United Kingdom,163 and the United States,164 all of which had sanc-
tioned the notion that management held fiduciary duties to creditors 
                                                                                                                      
cability and Operability of Legislation, in Constitutional Law: Cases, Commentary, and 
Principles 155, 157–67 (Leonard I. Rotman et al. eds., 2008) (describing the concurrency 
of federal and provincial jurisdiction known as the “Double Aspect Doctrine” and illustrat-
ing its applicability to business owners). 
159 See Ronald J. Gibson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 
40 Am. J. Comp. L. 329, 350 (2001); Griffiths, supra note 133, at 3. 
160 Peoples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 461. 
161 See, e.g., Spies v. R. (2000) 201 C.L.R. 603, 637; Walker v. Wimborne (1976) 137 
C.L.R. 1, 10; Kinsela v. Russell Proprietary Ltd. (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722, 730. 
162 See, e.g., H. Timber Prot. Ltd. v. Hickson Int’l Pub. Ltd., [1995] 2 N.Z.L.R. 8, 13 
(C.A.); Nicholson v. Permakraft (N.Z.) Ltd., [1985] 1 N.Z.L.R. 242, 249 (C.A.); Hilton Int’l 
Ltd. v. Hilton, [1989] 1 N.Z.L.R. 442, 475–76 (H.C.). 
163 See, e.g., Winkworth v. Edward Baron Dev. Co., (1987) 1 All E.R. 114, 118 (H.L.); 
Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co., (1980) 1 W.L.R. 627, 634 (H.L.); Liquidator of West 
Mercia Safetywear Ltd. v. Dodd, (1988) 4 B.C.C. 30, 31–32 (C.A.); Re Horsley & Weight 
Ltd, [1982] Ch. 442, 454 (U.K.). 
164 See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *33–34. 
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when a corporation was near insolvency,165 Canadian law remained un-
settled on the issue when the Peoples action commenced.166 
 In the Peoples case,167 the Wise brothers were the sole directors of 
the Wise Stores department store chain. In 1992, Wise Stores pur-
chased all of the shares in a troubled competitor chain, Peoples De-
partment Stores Inc. (Peoples) pursuant to a highly-leveraged purchase 
agreement. Following its purchase of Peoples, Wise Stores sought to 
improve the efficiency of its expanded operations by implementing a 
new inventory procurement policy. Under this policy, Peoples pur-
chased all inventory for the two chains from North American suppliers, 
and Wise Stores bought all inventory from international suppliers. As 
North American goods constituted 82% of both chains’ inventory pur-
chases, Peoples became heavily indebted for inventory from which 
profits were primarily retained by Wise Stores. 
 Less than a year after implementing this inventory procurement 
policy, Peoples and Wise Stores were both petitioned into bankruptcy. 
Although the financing bank was paid in full and the vendor of Wise 
Stores suffered only a 1% loss on the purchase price, trade creditors 
were still owed approximately $21.5 million. Peoples’ trustee in bank-
ruptcy commenced an action on behalf of Peoples’ unsecured creditors 
                                                                                                                      
165 Note, however, that the judgment of the Delaware Supreme Court in North American 
Catholic Educational Programming Foundation Inc. v. Gheewalla, altered the effects of Credit 
Lyonnais, holding that creditors held claims against corporate directors only during actual 
insolvency rather than during the nebulous “vicinity of insolvency,” though accepting its 
theme of duty shifting. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101–02; Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at 
*33; see Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 
107 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1343 (2007). 
166 One of the only cases on point prior to the trial judgment in Peoples was Re Trizec 
Corp., [1994] 10 W.W.R. 127, 139 (Can.), in which the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
said: 
A specific duty to shareholders becomes intermingled with a duty to creditors 
when the ability of a company to pay its debts becomes questionable. How-
ever, a wholesale transfer of fiduciary duty to creditors likely does not occur at 
the stage of proceedings where an arrangement is sought as opposed to a case 
where liquidation occurs. 
Id. After the trial judgment in Peoples was released, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
released a judgment that supported the existence of management’s fiduciary duties to 
creditors upon or in the vicinity of insolvency. Canbook Distrib. Corp. v. Bornis, [1999] 45 
O.R.3d 565, 574 (Can.). After the Quebec Court of Appeal reversed the trial judgment in 
Peoples and found no fiduciary duty owed by Peoples’ management to its creditors, the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice again indicated that fiduciary duties could be owed by 
management to creditors in a manner essentially similar to what it had previously stated in 
Canbook. See Peoples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 485–86; Dylex Ltd. v. Anderson, [2003] 63 O.R.3d 
659, 669–70 (Can.). 
167 See Peoples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 481. 
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against the Wise brothers in their capacities as directors of Peoples. The 
action claimed that the Wise brothers had breached their fiduciary du-
ties and duties of care under section 122(1) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act (CBCA).168 
 In the Canadian Supreme Court’s unanimous judgment, Justices 
Major and Deschamps held that Peoples’ directors had not violated 
either their fiduciary duties or duties of care under section 122(1). The 
court took care to distinguish between these duties, however. As the 
court indicated, the fiduciary duty, or duty of loyalty, “require[ed] di-
rectors and officers to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the 
best interests of the corporation,” while the duty of care imposed a duty 
of diligence on management in supervising and managing a corpora-
tion’s affairs.169 The court expressly noted that the trial judge in Peoples 
had not separately considered these duties in his judgment; moreover, 
it emphasized that those duties “are, in fact, distinct and are designed 
to secure different ends.”170 
 The court’s emphasis on the distinction between management’s 
fiduciary duties and its duty of care is reflected in most Canadian cor-
porate law statutes. Section 122(1) of the CBCA is reflective of the 
structure and, for the most part, the wording of most provincial corpo-
rations statutes: 
(1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising 
their powers and discharging their duties shall 
 (a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best in-
terests of the corporation; and 
 (b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably pru- 
dent person would exercise in comparable circumstances.171 
This physical and conceptual separation of management’s fiduciary 
duties and duties of care in Canadian law is a notable distinction from 
U.S. corporate law jurisprudence, particularly in Delaware, which has 
tended to conflate these duties.172 
                                                                                                                      
168 Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), R.S.C., ch. C-44 § 122(1) (1985); Peo-
ples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 462. 
169 See Peoples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 476. 
170 Id. at 476–77. 
171 CBCA § 122. Subsection 122(1)(a) is the statutory embodiment of management’s 
fiduciary duties, while subsection 122(1)(b) outlines the duties of care owed by manage-
ment. Id. 
172 See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); McMullin v. Beran, 
765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); Cinerama, 
Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
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 Despite the fact that corporate fiduciaries owe each of these duties, 
not all are fiduciary duties. Although a fiduciary may owe a duty of care 
or a duty of good faith, those duties do not become fiduciary duties 
simply because a fiduciary owes them. Fiduciary duties pertain to con-
flicts of interest such as self-dealing, and the duty to act on behalf of 
one’s beneficiaries rather than in one’s own interest or on behalf of the 
interests of third parties. The duty of care is a tort duty under which a 
party is obliged to exercise the same level of care on behalf of others 
that would be expected of ordinarily prudent persons in the conduct of 
their own affairs.173 Meanwhile, the duty of good faith is a contractual 
standard of honesty in the discharge of one’s obligations and is limited 
to the range of duties outlined in the contract.174 
 In dismissing the creditors’ claim, the Canadian Supreme Court 
held that the directors are obliged to “serve the corporation selflessly, 
honestly and loyally,”175 but it also emphasized that “[a]t all times, di-
rectors and officers owe their fiduciary obligation to the corpora-
tion.”176 The court further explained that “[t]he interests of the corpo-
ration are not to be confused with the interests of creditors or those of 
any other stakeholders.”177 The court stressed that management’s fidu-
ciary duties do not change when a corporation is in the vicinity of in-
solvency.178 Consequently, in assessing the nature of the claim before it, 
                                                                                                                      
634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (referencing a fiduciary “triad” comprised of the duties of 
care, good faith, and loyalty). Although more recent Delaware decisions have tended to 
retreat from the fiduciary triad formulation, they still conflate the fiduciary duties of loy-
alty with duties of care. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (describing 
the duty of good faith as part of the duty of loyalty). This conflation is also reflected in 
academic commentary. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the 
Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 1769, 1771 (2007) (“Classically, courts and 
commentators have identified two types of fiduciary duty of corporate officers and direc-
tors: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.”). Hill and McDonnell identify this conflation 
of the duties of loyalty and care as being enshrined in a number of corporate law case-
books. Id.; see Jesse H. Choper et al., Cases and Materials on Corporations 74–179 
(6th ed. 2004); William A. Klein et al., Business Associations 328–412 (6th ed. 2006); 
D. Gordon Smith & Cynthia A. Williams, Business Organizations: Cases, Problems, 
and Case Studies 395–524 (2004). 
173 Although, curiously, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act expressly states that the 
duty of care is a fiduciary duty owed by partners. Revised Unif. P’ship Act § 404(a), 6 
U.L.A. 143 (1997). 
174 Id. cmt. 4. 
175 Peoples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 477. 
176 Id. at 482–83. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 483. Note also the court’s comments that “that phrase [vicinity of insolvency] 
has not been defined; moreover, it is incapable of definition and has no legal meaning.” 
Id. 
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the Canadian Supreme Court suggested that the creditors ought to 
have sought an oppression remedy rather than relief for breach of fi-
duciary duty.179 
 The Canadian Supreme Court’s contention in Peoples
 
that there 
was no need for management to owe fiduciary duties to creditors on 
the eve of insolvency because of the existence of the statutory oppres-
sion remedy, notwithstanding its breadth,180 is neither logical nor ap-
propriate.181 In many situations in law, concurrent or overlapping du-
ties or obligations exist, as evidenced by the concurrent duties present 
in contract and tort. Yet, the fact that some claims may be brought in 
either contract or tort does not warrant the insistence that one or the 
other is, a priori, denied applicability. Matters ought not be any differ-
ent for claims of a breach of fiduciary duty in the face of overlapping 
oppression claims.182 It is not the proper function of a court to decide 
                                                                                                                      
179 See id. at 483–84. Indeed, the Canadian Supreme Court stated that “[i]f the stake-
holders cannot avail themselves of the statutory fiduciary duty (the duty of loyalty, supra) 
to sue the directors for failing to take care of their interests, they have other means at their 
disposal.” Id. Specifically, the court indicated that “[t]he oppression remedy of s. 241(2) of 
the CBCA and the similar provisions of provincial legislation regarding corporations grant 
the broadest rights to creditors of any common law jurisdiction.” Id. at 484. Importantly, 
however, the creditors in Peoples did not seek an oppression remedy against Peoples’ man-
agement. Id. at 481–82. 
180 Id. at 483. The breadth of the oppression remedy, which is considered infra Part 
II.B.3.b, has sometimes led Canadian courts to inappropriate conclusions which suggest 
that the oppression remedy has overtaken or absorbed other causes of action. See, e.g., 
Brant Invs. Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc., [1991] 80 D.L.R.4th 161, 172 (Can.) (discussing the 
breadth of the statutory oppression remedy). The purpose of the oppression remedy is not 
to remove existing bases of legal or equitable claims but to provide a method for relief 
against oppressive conduct. Where such conduct also fits within the scope of other legal 
claims, such as breach of fiduciary duty, the breadth of the oppression remedy should not 
be understood to supersede any other appropriate basis of legal action. 
181 Peoples was not the first Canadian case to have ventured down this path. See Brant 
Invs., 80 D.L.R.4th at 172. In Brant Investments, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that it was 
“unnecessary and . . . inappropriate” to saddle directors or majority shareholders with 
fiduciary duties towards minority shareholders in light of the existence of the broad statu-
tory oppression remedy. Id. This statement was made, at least in part, because the court 
held that “the evidence necessary to establish a breach of fiduciary duty would be sub-
sumed in the broader range of evidence which would be appropriately adduced on an 
application under the section.” Id. 
182 As suggested in Leonard I. Rotman, Fiduciary Law 503–04 (2005): 
It matters not a wit to the lawful determination of a plaintiff’s claim whether 
that plaintiff had other causes of action available that were not pleaded; ra-
ther, what is relevant is simply whether the cause of action pleaded may be 
properly made out on the facts. This is clearly indicated by Viscount Haldane 
in Nocton v. Lord Ashburton: 
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how a plaintiff ought to frame his or her claim in an action. All a court 
is entrusted to do is to assess the relative merits of the claims advanced 
by the plaintiff once they are asserted. 
 To further entrench the idea that management’s duties are owed 
to “the corporation,” the Canadian Supreme Court in Peoples empha-
sized that “the phrase ‘the best interests of the corporation’ should be 
read not simply as the ‘best interests of the shareholders.’”183 In so do-
ing, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the shareholder primacy model is 
quite clear. The court placed all stakeholder interests on the same level 
in the context of assessing a corporation’s best interests, stating: 
[I]n determining whether they are acting with a view to the 
best interests of the corporation, it may be legitimate, given all 
the circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to 
consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the envi-
ronment.184 
 Unlike the situation with management’s fiduciary duties, the court 
held that its duties of care were not restricted to the corporation but 
could directly apply to stakeholders such as creditors.185 Nonetheless, it 
                                                                                                                      
It did not matter that the client would have had a remedy in damages 
for breach of contract. Courts of Equity had jurisdiction to direct ac-
counts to be taken, and in proper cases to order the solicitor to re-
place property improperly acquired from the client, or to make com-
pensation if he had lost it by acting in breach of a duty which arose 
out of his confidential relationship to the man who had trusted him. 
Justice La Forest acknowledges this same idea in his own judgment in M.(K.) 
v. M.(H.), where he expressly states that “a breach of fiduciary duty cannot be 
automatically overlooked in favour of concurrent common law claims.” Simi-
larly, in Hodgkinson v. Simms, La Forest J. states that “the existence of a con-
tract does not necessarily preclude the existence of fiduciary obligations be-
tween the parties . . . .” For these reasons, the rationale behind the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in Peoples has no sound basis in law. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
183 Peoples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 481. Although the court conceded, that, from an eco-
nomic perspective, “the ‘best interests of the corporation’ means the maximization of the 
value of the corporation,” it held that various other factors were relevant when directors 
considered how to manage the corporation with a view to its best interests. Id. These con-
siderations included the interests held by the various stakeholders of the corporation. Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 488 (“[U]nlike the statement of the fiduciary duty in s. 122(1)(a) of the 
CBCA, which specifies that directors and officers must act with a view to the best interests 
of the corporation, the statement of the duty of care in s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA does not 
specifically refer to an identifiable party as the beneficiary of the duty.”). 
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concluded that Peoples’ directors had not breached their duty of good 
faith to the creditors in implementing the new inventory procurement 
policy, as that was deemed a valid exercise of management’s business 
judgment. 
 Although the Peoples judgment stands for the proposition that cor-
porate management owes fiduciary duties to the corporation and not 
to any particular stakeholder, it articulates a rather broad vision of the 
stakeholders whose interests may be considered by corporate manage-
ment in discharging its fiduciary duties to the corporation. Indeed, the 
potential stakeholder interests that are recognized as a result of the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s analysis in Peoples—particularly government 
and the environment—are likely broader than the range of corporate 
stakeholders generally contemplated by most progressive scholars. 
 The Peoples case was a watershed in Canadian corporate jurispru-
dence as the first Supreme Court case to overtly consider and reject the 
shareholder primacy model in ascertaining the object of management’s 
fiduciary duties. Nonetheless, Peoples did not usher in a new manner of 
thinking about the recipients of corporate management’s fiduciary du-
ties, whether in Canada or elsewhere.186 Despite the fact that the Peoples 
case may not have carved out a new way of thinking about the benefici-
aries of corporate management’s duties, it did broadcast its conclusions 
much more broadly than had previously been communicated in Cana-
dian corporate law. 
b. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (2008):187 Management Must Re-
spect the Interests of All Stakeholders 
 In BCE Inc., the Canadian Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
revisit its comments about corporate management’s duties in Peoples in 
the context of a going-private transaction involving the leveraged buy-
out (LBO) of telecom giant BCE Inc. The $52 billion transaction, at 
the time the largest private equity deal in history,188 offered a premium 
of more than 40% to BCE Inc.’s common shareholders, or approxi-
                                                                                                                      
186 See McClurg v. Canada, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1020, 1040–41 (Can.); Teck Corp. v. Millar, 
[1972] 33 D.L.R.3d 288, 314 (Can.); Re Olympia & York Enter., [1986] 59 O.R.2d 254, 271 
(Can.). 
187 [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 560. 
188 See Peter Lattman, BCE Leveraged Buyout Deal Collapses, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 2008, at 
C3. The deal ultimately collapsed as a result of an opinion delivered by accounting firm 
KPMG, which concluded that it could not provide a certificate of solvency for BCE Inc. as 
required under the terms of the deal, because of market conditions and the huge debt 
load that BCE would carry once it emerged from the deal. Id. 
2010] Debunking the “End of History” Thesis for Corporate Law 251 
mately $10 billion over the value of the shares prior to the time they 
were put in play. The deal would also have resulted in the assumption 
of $30 billion in debt by BCE’s wholly owned subsidiary, Bell Canada. 
 BCE Inc. sought court approval of the LBO as required under sec-
tion 192 of the CBCA.189 The plan of arrangement was approved by 
97.93% of BCE Inc.’s common shareholders, but opposed by certain 
Bell Canada debentureholders, who claimed that Bell Canada’s as-
sumption of the $30 billion debt would reduce the value of their bonds 
by an average of 20% and lower their trade value from their “invest-
ment grade” rating.190 Consequently, the debentureholders sought an 
oppression remedy pursuant to section 241 of the CBCA. They also op-
posed the trial court’s approval of the arrangement under section 192 
as not being “fair and reasonable” due to the negative effect on their 
economic interests.191 
 In determining the merits of the debentureholders’ claim, the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court examined the actions of BCE Inc.’s directors in 
accepting the purchase arrangement.192 As no duty of care claim arose, 
the court’s focus was solely on the directors’ fiduciary duty. The Su-
preme Court affirmed that the directors owed a fiduciary duty to “the 
corporation,” as it had concluded in Peoples, and that directors may 
consider the impact of corporate decisions on stakeholders other than 
shareholders.193 The court held that the content of management’s duty 
                                                                                                                      
189 CBCA § 192. Subsection 192(3) reads as follows: 
Application to court for approval of arrangement—Where it is not practica-
ble for a corporation that is not insolvent to effect a fundamental change in 
the nature of an arrangement under any other provision of this Act, the cor-
poration may apply to a court for an order approving an arrangement pro-
posed by the corporation. 
Id. 
190 See BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 577. In addition, the debenture downgrade could 
have forced debentureholders with credit rating restrictions to sell their debentures at a 
loss. See id. 
191 See id. at 578. Initially, the debentureholders also brought motions for declaratory 
relief under the terms of the trust indentures, although that issue was not before the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court. See id. 
192 See id. at 605. For the purpose of the appeal, the Canadian Supreme Court held 
that it did not need to distinguish between the conduct of the directors of BCE and the 
directors of Bell Canada, since the same directors served on the boards of both corpora-
tions. See id. at 582. 
193 See id. at 584. The court reaffirmed its finding in Peoples that the stakeholders whose 
interests may be considered included “inter alia, shareholders, employees, creditors, con-
sumers, governments and the environment.” See id. at 585. 
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was not limited to fostering short-term profit or increasing share value, 
but extended to the corporation’s long-term interests.194 
 The remainder of the judgment in BCE Inc. considered the appli-
cation of the oppression remedy to the alternative claims asserted by 
the debentureholders that: (1) they expected that BCE Inc.’s manage-
ment would maintain the investment grade trading value of their de-
bentures and; (2) at a minimum, that management would consider 
their economic interests in maintaining the debentures’ trade value.195 
The Supreme Court’s finding is problematic, however, because it states 
that where directors account for the interests of stakeholders in assess-
ing the best interests of the corporation, courts should give appropriate 
deference to directors’ business judgment under the business judgment 
rule.196 
 In opposition to conventional wisdom, the business judgment rule 
does not properly apply to fiduciary duties, but only to duties of care. 
Notwithstanding the problems associated with the conflation of direc-
tors’ fiduciary duties and their duties of care in Delaware jurispru-
dence,197 Justice Brandeis’s opinion in United Copper Securities Co. v. 
Amalgamated Copper Co. is perfectly clear in stating that the business 
judgment rule applies only to the duties of care.198 As he asserted in 
that case, “Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires 
the corporation, except where directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a 
breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an un-
prejudiced exercise of judgment.”199 Thus, as stated in Lewis v. S.L. & E., 
                                                                                                                      
194 Id. at 584. 
195 Id. at 602. For a discussion of this aspect of the judgment, see infra Part II.B.3.b. 
196 See BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 585. 
197 See, e.g., Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90; McMullin, 765 A.2d at 917; Brincat, 722 
A.2d at 10; Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1164; Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. 
198 See 244 U.S. 261, 263–64 (1917). 
199 Id. at 263–64 (emphasis added); see also Edward M. Iacobucci, A Wise Decision? An 
Analysis of the Relationship Between Corporate Ownership Structure and Directors’ and Officers’ 
Duties, 36 Can. Bus. L.J. 337, 364–65 (2002) (stating that “[d]ifferent standards of scrutiny 
apply to the duty of care and to fiduciary duties, and with good reason: a deferential stan-
dard is appropriate for the duty of care, but not for fiduciary duties”); Lawrence E. Mit-
chell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425, 437 n.39 (1993). Mitchell ob-
serves: 
In the absence of fiduciary misconduct, courts refuse to inquire into the mer-
its of a given business decision and to impose fiduciary liability regardless of 
the outcome of that decision under the doctrinal rubric of the business 
judgment rule. . . . When misconduct is characterized as a breach of the duty 
of care, the business judgment rule’s presumption is overcome and liability is 
imposed on the fiduciary without further  inquiry beyond the amount of 
damages. . . . When the fiduciary’s misconduct is characterized as a breach of 
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Inc., “[T]he business judgment rule presupposes that the directors have 
no conflict of interest,” and that “[w]hen a shareholder attacks a trans-
action in which the directors have an interest other than as directors of 
the corporation, the directors may not escape review of the merits of 
the transaction.”200 
 As a result, courts need not defer to the actions of directors in ap-
plying their fiduciary duties but may appropriately review their deci-
sions for consistency with fiduciary standards without offending the 
business judgment rule. Therefore, the purpose of the business judg-
ment rule is not to insulate directors from liability for the exercise of 
their powers over the corporation, but to provide adequate deference 
to decisions that, as indicated in Aronson v. Lewis, are made “on an in-
formed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was 
in the best interests of the company.”201 
 Some notable points that are relevant to the nature of directors’ 
fiduciary duties are also observable in the part of the BCE Inc. judg-
ment focusing on oppression. Initially, the court indicated that both 
the corporation and its shareholders are “entitled to maximize profit 
and share value . . . but not by treating individual stakeholders un-
fairly.”202 The difficulty with this proposition is that both BCE Inc. and 
Peoples establish that stakeholders cannot claim a breach of fiduciary 
duty against management, since its fiduciary duties are owed only to 
the corporation. The court in BCE Inc., however, links the notion of 
unfair treatment to the oppression remedy, holding that fair treatment 
is “the central theme running through the oppression jurispru-
dence.”203 Accordingly, the duty to treat stakeholders fairly, as guaran-
teed by the oppression remedy, may serve as a limiting factor on direc-
tors’ ability to fulfill their fiduciary duties. This situation may explain 
why directors, in fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the corporation, may 
well wish to consider the impact of their actions on other stakeholders, 
as indicated in both Peoples and BCE Inc. 
                                                                                                                      
the duty of loyalty, courts do not typically impose liability on the fiduciary au-
tomatically but rather evaluate the transaction to determine whether it is fair 
to the corporation. 
Id. 
200 Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980). Furthermore, as the court 
stated in Peoples, fiduciary duties and duties of care are “designed to secure different ends.” 
Peoples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 476–77. 
201 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
202 BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 592. 
203 Id. 
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 The BCE Inc. judgment stresses that management must ensure that 
it comports itself “in accordance with [its] fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interests of the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen”204 
where it is faced with the conflicting interests of the corporation and its 
stakeholders. This signifiess that a court, in reviewing the actions of 
corporate management, must inquire whether “in all the circum-
stances, the directors acted in the best interests of the corporation, hav-
ing regard to all relevant considerations, including, but not confined 
to, the need to treat affected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensu-
rate with the corporation’s duties as a good corporate citizen.”205 
 The court’s requirement in BCE Inc. that a corporation must act as 
a “good corporate citizen” requires that its management consider the 
interests of all of its stakeholders, not only its shareholders. This finding 
is consistent with the contention made herein that the shareholder pri-
macy model is not reflective of Canadian law’s understanding of corpo-
rate governance. Any ambiguity on this point ought to be put to rest by 
the court’s subsequent assertion in BCE Inc. that “[t]here is no principle 
that one set of interests—for example the interests of shareholders— 
should prevail over another set of interests.”206 The key for corporate 
management in Canada, then, is to balance the interests of the various 
constituent groups for which it is obliged to account. This is clearly in-
consistent with Hansmann and Kraakman’s “end of history” thesis. 
3. Rejection of the Shareholder Primacy Model in Canadian Corporate 
Law Statutes 
 In addition to the Canadian Supreme Court’s recent corporate 
jurisprudence in Peoples and BCE Inc., there are other substantive rea-
sons to suggest that the shareholder primacy model does not hold sway 
in Canada. Two such reasons are firmly rooted in Canadian corporate 
law statutes: the existence of a more generally available derivative ac-
tion than that existing in the United States, as well as the presence of a 
wide-ranging statutory oppression remedy. 
                                                                                                                      
204 Id. at 607–08. 
205 Id. at 598. 
206 Id. 
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a. The Derivative Action 
 Derivative actions allow designated individuals207 to act in a repre-
sentative capacity on behalf of a corporation for wrongs committed 
against it when management itself does not initiate such actions.208 Any 
award made pursuant to a derivative action accrues to the corporation, 
not to the individual bringing the derivative suit.209 Pursuant to section 
240 of the CBCA, the range of potential relief available to a corporation 
under a derivative action is limited only by a court’s imagination, as the 
section allows the court the discretion to “make any order it thinks 
fit.”210 
 The Canadian derivative action is essentially similar to derivative 
actions that exist under U.S. corporate law statutes, but with one nota-
ble difference. Pursuant to U.S. corporate law, only shareholders may 
generally bring derivative actions.211 In Canada, any person who quali-
fies as a “complainant” under section 238 of the CBCA may be granted 
leave to bring a derivative action.212 This important difference is rele-
vant in assessing whether corporate governance in Canada follows a 
shareholder primacy model. CBCA section 239(2) defines complain-
ants as any of the following persons: 
 (a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former 
registered holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a corpo-
ration or any of its affiliates; 
 (b) a director or an officer or a former director or officer 
of a corporation or any of its affiliates; 
                                                                                                                      
207 See CBCA § 238. Persons who are deemed to be appropriate “complainant[s]” and 
therefore have carriage of a derivative action are defined under the statutes that authorize 
such actions or under the common law, where appropriate. Id. 
208 See id. § 239. The derivative action exists only because of the problems inherent in 
the notion of corporate legal personality. Corporate decisions are made on a corporation’s 
behalf by its management, which is bound by fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of 
the corporation; enforcing these fiduciary duties is difficult, however, if the only actors 
who can represent the corporation are the very managers who may have violated those 
duties. This explains why other individuals are allowed to represent the corporation’s in-
terests via the derivative action where management fails to assume such responsibility. Id. 
209 See id. (noting that complainant brings action “in the name and on behalf of a cor-
poration”). Given that the derivative action is a representative action on behalf of the cor-
poration that seeks recompense for harm done to the corporation, any proceeds awarded 
from the litigation logically flow to the corporation, not the complainant. See id. § 240. 
210 Id. § 240. 
211 Note, however, the exception for creditors who bring such claims where corpora-
tions are insolvent, which is discussed in greater detail below. 
212 CBCA § 238. 
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 (c) the Director;213 or 
 (d) any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a 
proper person to make an application under this Part.214 
The key element in the definition of complainant is subsection (d), 
which, to date, has been interpreted to include creditors,215 but which 
is open-ended regarding potential complainants.216 
 In the United States, the assertion that only shareholders are gen-
erally able to bring derivative actions is subject to the financial condition 
of the corporation. Although U.S. case law extended the ability to bring 
derivative actions to creditors in circumstances where a corporation was 
“on the eve of” or “in the vicinity of” insolvency, in Credit Lyonnais,217 it 
has now limited that action, in North American Catholic Educational Pro-
gramming Foundation Inc. v. Gheewalla, to situations of actual insolvency.218 
Thus, in practice, those who have been able to bring derivative actions 
in Canada and the United States are the same individuals. A creditor in 
Canada, however, need not wait until a corporation is insolvent to be 
granted standing as a complainant. Where persons seeking leave to 
bring a derivative action are not shareholders, Canadian courts will as-
sess the connection between the claimant, its interests, and the corpora-
tion’s own interests in deciding whether to grant the leave requested.219 
Consequently, the derivative action is of potentially greater applicability 
in Canada than it is in the United States, as any interested person who 
                                                                                                                      
213 See id. § 2(1). “‘Director’ means the Director appointed under section 260,” who is 
essentially the registrar for the Act. See id. § 260. 
214 Id. § 239(2). 
215 See, e.g., Dylex, 63 O.R.3d at 667–68. 
216 See, e.g., BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 586 (noting that potential complainants in-
clude security holders, creditors, directors, and officers). As indicated by the CBCA, how-
ever, the range of possible complainants is much broader than this. See CBCA § 239. 
217 See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *33–34 *& n.55. 
218 See Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101–02. There is an important difference, however, be-
tween allowing creditors to bring derivative actions on behalf of corporations and allowing 
creditors to bring direct breach of fiduciary duty claims against corporate management. 
See, e.g., Prod. Res. Group, 863 A.2d at 793–95. 
219 See, e.g., Re Daon Dev. Corp., [1984] 10 D.L.R.4th 216, 223 (Can.). In this case, an 
application by a debentureholder to be certified as a complainant in order to bring a de-
rivative action was denied on the basis that the debentureholder was not a “proper person” 
under the then-applicable British Columbia statute since the applicant’s “only interest in 
the management of the company is the general and indirect one of wishing to see the 
company prosper.” See id. The British Columbia statute in question did not include a provi-
sion characterizing “any other person” as a complainant, though. See First Edmonton Place 
v. 315888 Alba. Ltd., [1988] 60 Alta. L.R.2d 122, 154 (Can.). In First Edmonton Place, how-
ever, it was held that a creditor need not hold a direct interest in the corporation to be a 
“proper person” to bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. See id. at 154–57. 
2010] Debunking the “End of History” Thesis for Corporate Law 257 
may demonstrate a suitable connection to the corporation’s interests 
may be authorized to bring a derivative suit.220 
 Blair and Stout have suggested that the existence of the share-
holder derivative action appears to support the proposition that U.S. 
corporate law follows the shareholder primacy model.221
 
Nevertheless, 
they contend that the practical effects of the derivative action actually 
support the broader interests of the firm, rather than only those of 
shareholders.222 Most obviously, they note that the “requirement that 
damages be paid directly to the firm and not to the suing shareholders 
seems difficult to explain under the norm of shareholder primacy.”223 
Allowing a greater range of persons to bring derivative actions certainly 
speaks more to communitarian models than to the shareholder pri-
macy model.224 
 The potential for a broader range of complainants that is provided 
for under Canadian division of powers corporate statutes, (like the 
CBCA), creates an important distinction between the Canadian deriva-
tive action and its U.S. counterparts. This distinction provides another 
basis for suggesting that the shareholder primacy model does not hold 
sway in Canada. Further supporting the opposition to shareholder pri-
macy, the CBCA clearly indicates that evidence of shareholder approval 
is not determinative in a court’s consideration as to whether a motion 
to seek leave to commence a derivative action should be allowed.225 
                                                                                                                      
220 See Stephanie Ben-Ishai, A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law, 44 Al-
ta. L. Rev. 299, 307 (2007). While the statute allows derivative actions to be brought by any 
complainant, in practice, most derivative actions are brought by shareholders. See id. 
221 See Blair & Stout, supra  note 13, at 287–88, 293. 
222 See id. at 293. These include: (1) the procedural hurdles and substantive limitations 
on the use of the derivative action; (2) the fact that relief goes to the corporation, rather 
than the party bringing the derivative action, and; (3) that in certain circumstances, such 
as in the case of an insolvent corporation or one in the vicinity of insolvency, non-
shareholder stakeholders may be granted standing to bring derivative actions. See id. The 
procedural hurdles associated with the derivative action include, inter alia, a requirement 
for shareholders to first demand that directors take legal action on the corporation’s be-
half before they may undertake a derivative action. See id. This requirement exists because 
corporate management, which possesses the duty to act in the corporation’s best interests, 
is best-positioned to bring a claim on behalf of the corporation. The exception to this rule 
arises in situations where a conflict of interest can be shown connecting management’s 
own actions, or inaction, to the harm the corporation allegedly suffered. See id. 
223 Id. at 295. 
224 Although Blair and Stout contend that the practical effects of the derivative action 
support a director primacy norm for U.S. corporate law, these effects do indicate a lack of 
support for the shareholder primacy model. See Blair & Stout, supra note 13, at 290–309. 
225 See CBCA § 242(1). 
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 The limited use to date of the derivative action in Canada does not 
provide conclusive proof that it cannot serve as a significant avenue for 
either shareholders or other complainants under Canadian law. The 
question of whether the derivative action is currently being effectively 
utilized presumably has more to do with the nature of the applications 
being made and the generally restrictive manner in which the courts 
have interpreted them, than the ineffectiveness of the action itself. De-
rivative action clauses in corporate law statutes, after all, are only per-
missive: they simply grant the ability to complainants to seek leave to 
bring an action, but they do not guarantee the ability to bring the ac-
tion itself. That determination rests solely with the courts. 
 As a result of Peoples and BCE Inc., it is now generally understood 
that Canadian corporate law follows a model other than shareholder 
primacy. For this reason, the decisions should influence the manner in 
which judges assess motions for leave to bring derivative action claims 
in Canada. Further, the decisions are likely to broaden the instances 
and range of non-shareholder complainants granted leave to bring 
those actions in that country. 
b. The Oppression Remedy 
 A person who qualifies as a complainant in order to launch a de-
rivative action under Canadian corporate statutes is also eligible to bring 
an action for an oppression remedy.226 Unlike the derivative action, 
                                                                                                                      
226 Creditors have been found to qualify as complainants under Canadian division of 
powers corporations statutes, such as the CBCA, and are thus able to seek an oppression 
remedy where corporate directors and officers act in a manner that is “oppressive or un-
fairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards [their] interests . . . .” In R. v. Sands Motor 
Hotel Ltd., a creditor was considered to be a “proper person” entitled to bring an applica-
tion for relief under the oppression remedy. [1985] 36 Sask. R. 45, 48 (Can.); see also Si-
daplex-Plastic Suppliers Inc. v. Elta Group Inc., [1999] 40 O.R.3d 563, 563 (Can.); Levy-
Russell Ltd. v. Shieldings Inc., [1998] 41 O.R.3d 54, 55 (Can.). In First Edmonton Place, the 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench held that the oppression remedy “would be available if 
the act or conduct of the directors or management of the corporation which is com-
plained of amounted to using the corporation as a vehicle for committing fraud upon a 
creditor.” First Edmonton Place, 60 Alta. L.R.2d at 145–46. The court stated: 
[T]he test of unfair prejudice or unfair disregard should encompass the fol-
lowing considerations: the protection of the underlying expectation of a cred-
itor in its arrangement with the corporation, the extent to which the acts 
complained of were unforeseeable or the creditor could reasonably have pro-
tected itself from such acts, and the detriment to the interests of the creditor. 
Id. at 146. The court did indicate, however, that these considerations were illustrative ra-
ther than exhaustive. See id.; see also Leonard I. Rotman et al., Canadian Corporate 
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however, an oppression remedy is a personal rather than representative 
suit.227 As any awards made pursuant to an oppression remedy accrue to 
the complainant personally, one might wonder why complainants would 
not prefer to bring oppression claims as opposed to derivative action 
claims. The rationale is that important distinctions between these two 
forms of action exist which demonstrate that they are not interchange-
able, and that the choice of action is not entirely the complainant’s to 
make. Moreover, the ensuing discussion of the oppression remedy in 
Canada reinforces the conclusion that Canada has rejected the “end of 
history” thesis. The oppression remedy in Canadian law is a wide-
ranging statutory cause of action that gives broad discretion to courts to 
grant a range of remedial aid to complainants whose legal and equitable 
interests are deemed to have been “oppressed.” In this sense, it differs 
from the derivative action, pursuant to which any relief that is granted is 
awarded to the corporation. Also, unlike the derivative action, a com-
plainant does not require leave of the court to bring an oppression 
claim. A complainant may file an oppression claim via simple applica-
tion, which a court may summarily consider, whereas a derivative action 
may only be commenced by action.228 
 In the United States, oppression actions may exist either by statu-
tory authority or under the common law. Like the Canadian oppression 
remedy, they provide minority shareholders with a cause of action that 
protects them against majority control. Not all states have a statutory 
oppression remedy in their corporations statutes, however. For exam-
ple, Delaware does not have an oppression remedy in its leading corpo-
rations statute.229 Even where statutory oppression actions do exist, they 
are not as broad as the Canadian variety. Some states have limited op-
                                                                                                                      
Law: Cases, Notes & Materials, 447–549 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing the elements of op-
pression and excerpts from case law). 
227 See Goldex Mines Ltd. v. Revill, [1974] 7 O.R.2d. 216, 221 (Can.) (holding that  a 
complainant may join representative and personal actions as long as the procedural re-
quirements for each are fulfilled and the bases for the respective claims are sufficiently 
distinguished). 
228 Although an oppression remedy may be pursued by application via the use of affi-
davit evidence, in practice, the issues in an oppression claim are usually sufficiently com-
plex that a judge will require that the matter be tried by action in order to have the bene-
fits of a full trial. See, e.g., Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Canada, [1992] 12 O.R.3d 131, 132 
(Can.). 
229 The lack of an oppression remedy in Delaware could, however, simply affirm the 
notion of the “race to the bottom,” as many commentators have suggested, given the lack 
of this broad-based form of stakeholder protection. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 
517, 558–59 (1933); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 
83 Yale L.J. 663, 664–66 (1974) (discussing the origins of the “race to the bottom” idea in 
corporate law). 
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pression provisions that allow for court dissolution of the corpora-
tion,230 while other states’ oppression claims provide for a far wider 
range of relief.231 Furthermore, common law oppression actions, which 
have been sanctioned in leading cases such as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co.,232 are not always available from state to state. Notably, Delaware has 
failed to sanction the Donahue-type common law oppression action.233
 
Where oppression actions do exist under U.S. statute or common law, 
they are generally restricted to close corporations, which involve a ra-
ther different stakeholder dynamic than widely-held corporations. This 
restriction on the availability of oppression actions differs from the sit-
uation in Canada, where oppression can exist within either widely-held 
or close corporations.234 
                                                                                                                      
230 See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.30(2)(ii) (2005) (providing a similar limited form 
of oppression where “the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are 
acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent”). Upon proof of 
such circumstances by a shareholder, a court may dissolve the corporation. See id. 
231 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.751 (West 2004) (authorizing “any equitable relief” 
and specifically authorizing a buyout of a shareholder’s interest); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:12-
7(1) (West 2003) (providing a nonexclusive list of possible relief that includes the order of 
a buyout and the appointment of a provisional director or custodian); Douglas K. Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression and “Fair Value”: Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close 
Corporation, 54 Duke L.J. 293, 308 n.54 (2004). Moll further indicates that domestic courts 
have asserted that they are not restricted to statutory remedies for oppressive conduct, but 
may invoke various equitable remedies. Id. at 308 n.55 (citing Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 
A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J. 1993) (“Importantly, courts are not limited to the statutory remedies 
[for oppression], but have a wide array of equitable remedies available to them.”)); see also 
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395–96 (Or. 1973) (listing ten “al-
ternative remedies” for oppressive conduct). To the contrary position, however, Moll cites 
Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733 (Va. 1990), which describes the dissolution rem-
edy for oppression as “exclusive” and held that the trial court could not “fashion other . . . 
equitable remedies.” Other commentators have also indicated the growth of domestic 
corporate statutory provisions for oppression as extending beyond the remedy of dissolu-
tion. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 Bus. 
Law. 699, 708–09 (1993) (“[I]t makes more sense to view oppression not as a ground for 
dissolution, but as a remedy for shareholder dissension.”). 
232 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513–15 
(Mass. 1975). 
233 See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993). It might, however, be plausi-
bly argued that Delaware’s comparatively well-developed law of directors’ duties achieves 
substantially the same result as the oppression remedy, insofar as the majority’s acts of op-
pression generally require board action to implement. See Reinier R. Kraakman et al., The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 126 (2004). 
234 That being said, the Canadian Supreme Court has expressly stated that “[t]he size, 
nature and structure of the corporation are relevant factors in assessing reasonable expec-
tations.” BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 595–96. The court in BCE Inc. also said that “[c]ourts 
may accord more latitude to the directors of a small, closely held corporation to deviate 
from strict formalities than to the directors of a large public company,” and correspond-
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 Beck has described the oppression remedy in Canada as “beyond 
question, the broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended 
shareholder remedy in the common law world . . . unprecedented in its 
scope.”235 As with the derivative action, the range of remedies that may 
be imposed where oppression is found is uncircumscribed: in addition 
to certain enumerated remedies under section 241(3) of the CBCA, a 
court possesses the discretion to “make any interim or final order it 
thinks fit.”236 
 In most circumstances, an act of a corporation or its directors 
causes oppression. Nonetheless, the actions of shareholders or others 
may also cause oppression. Section 241 of the CBCA237
 
is illustrative of 
the form taken by the statutory oppression remedy in Canadian corpo-
rate law statutes, stating: 
(1) Application to court re oppression—A complainant may 
apply to a court for an order under this section. 
(2) Grounds—If, on an application under subsection (1), the 
court is satisfied that in respect of a corporation or any of its 
affiliates 
 (a) any act or omission of the corporation or any of its af-
filiates effects a result, 
 (b) the business or affairs of the corporation or any of its af-
filiates are or have been carried on or conducted in a manner, 
or 
 (c) the powers of the directors of the corporation or any 
of its affiliates are or have been exercised in a manner that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disre-
gards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director 
or officer, the court may make an order to rectify the matters 
complained of.238 
 The CBCA describes who may be oppressed and provides indicia of 
oppression but does not define what it means to be “oppressed.” Ra-
                                                                                                                      
ingly, “courts may accord greater latitude to the reasonableness of expectations formed in 
the context of a small, closely held corporation.” Id. 
235 Deluce Holdings, 12 O.R.3d at 133 (citing Stanley M. Beck, Minority Shareholder Rights 
in the 1980s, in Corporate Law in the 80s 311, 312 (Law Soc’y of Upper Can. ed., 1982)). 
236 CBCA § 242(3); see Deborah A. DeMott, Foreword, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1, 2 
(1993) (describing oppression as “a protean, amoeba-like concept that resists initial defini-
tion and indeed operates, at least in the Canadian context, to discourage and even defeat 
ex ante specifications of entitlements”). 
237 See CBCA § 242(1). 
238 Id. § 241. 
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ther, this determination is left to the courts,239 which have developed a 
variety of criteria to assist them in this task, including the “reasonable” 
and “legitimate” expectations of the allegedly oppressed party.240 In 
BCE Inc., the Canadian Supreme Court held that the determination of 
what is “reasonable” is an objective and contextual one rooted in the 
question: did the complainant reasonably hold the particular expecta-
tion claimed?241 Thus, the subjective expectations of any particular 
stakeholder are not conclusive.242 In addition, it said that not every 
unmet stakeholder expectation, even if reasonable, will give rise to an 
oppression claim under section 241, unless the conduct complained of 
is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregards the interests 
at stake.243 
 In BCE Inc., the Canadian Supreme Court suggested the following 
approach to interpreting the grounds of an oppression claim: 
One should look first to the principles underlying the oppres-
sion remedy, and in particular the concept of reasonable ex-
pectations. If a breach of a reasonable expectation is estab-
lished, one must go on to consider whether the conduct 
complained of amounts to “oppression”, “unfair prejudice” or 
“unfair disregard” as set out in s. 241(2) of the CBCA.244 
In Arthur v. Signum Communications Ltd., Justice Austin set out a number 
of factors that indicate the presence of oppressive conduct: 
(i) lack of a valid corporate purpose for the transaction; 
(ii) failure on the part of the corporation and its controlling 
shareholders to take reasonable steps to simulate an arm’s 
length transaction; 
(iii) lack of good faith on the part of the directors of the cor-
poration; 
                                                                                                                      
239 See BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 594–95; Arthur v. Signum Commc’ns Ltd., ¶¶ 14–17, 
[1993] O.J. No. 1928 (Div. Ct.) (Can.), 42 A.C.W.S. (3d) 332; First Edmonton Place, 60 Alta. 
L.R.2d at 145–46; Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Soc’y, Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324, 
342, 363–64 (U.K.). 
240 See, e.g., Hercules Mgmt. Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 165, 189 (Can.); 
Westfair Foods Ltd. v. Watt, [1991] 115 A.R. 34, 38 (Can.); 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold 
E. Ballard Ltd., [1991] 3 B.L.R.2d 113, 122 (Can.); Deluce Holdings, 12 O.R.3d at 133. 
241 BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 595. 
242 Id. at 591. 
243 Id. at 600. The court further indicated that the terms “oppression,” “unfair preju-
dice,” and “unfair disregard” are not watertight compartments, but often overlap and in-
termingle. Id. at 601. 
244 Id. at 590. 
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(iv) discrimination between shareholders with the effect of 
benefiting the majority shareholder to the exclusion or to the 
detriment of the minority shareholder; 
(v) lack of adequate and appropriate disclosure of material in-
formation to the minority shareholders; and 
(vi) a plan or design to eliminate the minority shareholder.245 
 In BCE Inc., the Supreme Court added its own factors, drawn from 
existing jurisprudence, including “general commercial practice; the 
nature of the corporation; the relationship between the parties; past 
practice; steps the claimant could have taken to protect itself; represen-
tations and agreements; and the fair resolution of conflicting interests 
between corporate stakeholders.”246 The Supreme Court indicated in 
BCE Inc. that the oppression remedy, although statutorily created, is 
equitable in nature and seeks to “ensure fairness—what is ‘just and eq-
uitable.’”247 Therefore, the oppression remedy provides courts with 
“broad, equitable jurisdiction to enforce not just what is legal but what 
is fair.”248 In making this assessment, the Supreme Court reveals in BCE 
Inc. that courts “should look at business realities, not merely narrow 
legalities.”249 
 The Canadian Supreme Court concluded that the debenturehold-
ers’ expectation of maintaining the investment grade trade value of 
their debentures was not reasonable. It found that the corporation had 
been put in play as a result of management exercising its duty to act in 
the corporation’s best interests. Further, all of the bids for BCE Inc. 
were leveraged and would have resulted in an increase in Bell Canada’s 
debt and a corresponding reduction in the trade value of the deben-
tures. The court thus held that no evidence suggested that BCE Inc.’s 
management could have done anything to avoid the risk to the deben-
tureholders, and, more importantly, the only evidence on point indi-
cated that the risk posed to the debentureholders resulting from the 
LBO was inevitable.250
 
Accordingly, the court deferred to the business 
judgment of management to accept the purchaser’s offer.251 
                                                                                                                      
245 Arthur v. Signum Commc’ns Ltd., ¶ 132, [1991] O.J. No. 86 (Ont. Gen. Div.) 
(Can.), aff’d [1993] O.J. No. 1928 (Div. Ct.) (Can.), 42 A.C.W.S. (3d) 332; see Krynen v. 
Bugg, [2003] 64 O.R.3d 393, 409–12 (Can.). 
246 BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 595. 
247 Id. at 590. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. (citing Scottish Co-operative, [1959] A.C. at 342–43). 
250 BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 605–06. Indeed, in setting out the terms of the auction 
process, BCE Inc. had advised potential participants that, in evaluating their bids, it would 
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 Although the court found that management had considered the 
interests of the debentureholders, there was no corresponding duty on 
management to act in those interests when management also had to 
consider competing stakeholder claims and the interests of the corpo-
ration itself. What the court did find was that management had consid-
ered the debentureholders’ interests and had assured them that the 
terms of the debentures would be met,252 but ultimately determined 
that those interests had to be subordinated to other concerns. As a re-
sult, the Supreme Court determined that there was no need for it to 
consider whether the conduct cited in the complaint oppressed, un-
fairly prejudiced, or unfairly disregarded the debentureholders’ inter-
ests.253 
 In practice, Canadian courts have imported fiduciary duty consid-
erations into their analyses of oppression claims.254 Thus, courts assess-
ing whether oppression exists often examine whether management’s 
actions are consistent with the corporation’s best interests, rather than 
focusing solely on the reasonable and legitimate expectations of com-
                                                                                                                      
“consider the impact that their proposed financial arrangements would have on BCE and 
on Bell Canada’s debentureholders and, in particular, whether their bids respected the 
debentureholders’ contractual rights under their trust indentures.” Id. at 576. 
251 Id. at 607–08. The court stated: 
The best interests of the corporation arguably favoured acceptance of the of-
fer at the time. BCE had been put in play, and the momentum of the market 
made a buyout inevitable. . . . Provided that, as here, the directors’ decision is 
found to have been within the range of reasonable choices that they could 
have made in weighing conflicting interests, the court will not go on to de-
termine whether their decision was the perfect one. 
Id. The Business Judgment Rule does not properly apply to ward off allegations of man-
agement’s breach of fiduciary duty, however. See United Copper, 244 U.S. at 263–64. 
252 BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 604. 
253 Id. at 608. The court also held that the trial judge had not erred in approving the 
arrangement under section 193 of the CBCA, though that issue is not particularly relevant 
to the matters considered herein. Id. at 611. 
254 See, e.g., Ballard Ltd., [1991] 3 B.L.R.2d at 113. The court held that: 
while it would be appropriate for a director to consider the individual desires 
of one or more various shareholders . . . it would be inappropriate for that di-
rector (or directors) to only consider the interests of certain shareholders 
and to either ignore the others or worse still act in a way detrimental to their 
interests. The safe way to avoid this problem is to have directors act in the 
best interests of the corporation [and have the shareholders derive their ben-
efit from a “better” corporation]. 
Id. 
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plainants.255 Indeed, there are similarities between breach of fiduciary 
duty claims and oppression claims. Neither requires the presence of 
bad faith,256
 
notwithstanding that oppressive conduct is necessarily an-
tagonistic to the interests of the complainant and may, in fact, be ex-
ploitative. Additionally, both oppression and fiduciary duty claims de-
pend on context, are fact-specific, and are activated upon certain forms 
of inequitable conduct or unfairness. 
 Unlike breach of fiduciary duty claims, which concern duties owed 
to the corporation, the analysis of oppression claims concerns the rea-
sonable and legitimate expectations of complainants. As the oppression 
remedy is personal to the complainant, it is only concerned with the 
complainant’s interests to the extent that those are consistent with the 
complainant’s reasonable and legitimate expectations. Meanwhile, 
management owes fiduciary duties to the corporation. Therefore, 
whether the actions of management in allegedly oppressing a complain-
ant are consistent with the corporation’s best interests—which may or 
may not be consonant with the corporation’s best interests generally 
speaking—ought not be material to the disposition of the oppression 
claim. 
 The continued use of fiduciary duty analysis in oppression cases 
may be affected by the Peoples judgment. In Peoples, management’s fidu-
ciary duty was distinguished from the oppression remedy through the 
court’s statement that the Peoples directors did not owe creditors a fi-
duciary duty, but that creditors ought to have instead argued that they 
were oppressed by the directors’ actions. That being said, the earlier 
warning to keep fiduciary duty analysis out of considerations of oppres-
sion claims in Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. seems to have had 
little impact on subsequent analyses of oppression claims. The Brant 
Investments court had stated: 
                                                                                                                      
255 See Peoples, [2004] 3 S.C.R. at 481 (referencing Ballard Ltd. and approving the no-
tion proposed in Ballard Ltd., that acting in the best interests of the corporation is an ap-
propriate benchmark for management in resolving conflicts between majority and minor-
ity shareholders). 
256 See Furs Ltd. v. Tomkies, [1936] 54 C.L.R. 583, 592 (H.C.) (Austl.); Boardman v. 
Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 104, 105, 112 (H.L.) (U.K.); Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, 
[1942] 2 A.C. 134, 137 (H.L.) (U.K.) (per Viscount Sankey: “In my view, the respondents 
were in a fiduciary position and their liability to account does not depend upon proof of 
mala fides”); Keech v. Sandford, [1726] 25 Eng. Rep. 223, 223–25 (Ch.) (U.K.); Rotman, 
supra note 182, at 660–61 (“[F]iduciary liability arises from fiduciaries’ departure from the 
fiduciary standard of conduct, not extraneous considerations such as fiduciaries’ subjective 
motivations or the presence of good faith or absence of bad faith.”); see also Brant Invs., 
[1991] 3 O.R.3d at 302–07 (discussing the irrelevance of bad faith to oppression claims). 
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 It must be recalled that in dealing with s. 234 [the oppres-
sion remedy section in the Ontario Business Corporations Act 
(“OBCA”)], the impugned acts, the results of the impugned 
acts, the protected groups, and the powers of the court to 
grant remedies are all extremely broad. To import the con-
cept of breach of fiduciary duty into that statutory provision 
would not only complicate its interpretation and application, 
but could be inimical to the statutory fiduciary duty imposed 
upon directors in s. 117 [the provision for directors’ and offi-
cers’ fiduciary duties under the OBCA, which is now section 
122(1)].257 
Adding to the confusion is that the judgment in BCE Inc. also indicates 
that fiduciary analysis does have a role to play in the assessment of op-
pression claims. 
 In assessing whether BCE Inc.’s management oppressed, unfairly 
prejudiced, or unfairly disregarded the debentureholders’ interests in 
agreeing to the LBO and reducing the trading value of their deben-
tures below investment grade, the Supreme Court held that it had to 
consider whether management engaged in a fair resolution of the con-
flicting interests of the corporation and of its stakeholders. This re-
quired determining whether management discharged its fiduciary duty 
to act in the best interests of the corporation which, in turn, compre-
hended “a duty to treat individual stakeholders affected by corporate 
actions fairly and equitably.”258 Thus, if management did not equitably 
and fairly consider all competing interests of individual stakeholders in 
agreeing to the LBO as required by oppression jurisprudence, it would 
have also failed to discharge its fiduciary duty.259 
 The Canadian Supreme Court in BCE Inc. effectively held that the 
process of assessing whether management engaged in the fair resolu-
tion of conflicting stakeholder interests—a necessary part of the in-
quiry into whether the expectations of a complainant are reasonable 
under the oppression remedy—is inextricably linked with manage-
ment’s fiduciary duty to act in the corporation’s best interests. This in-
ference is reflected in the court’s statement that, in oppression cases, it 
must inquire as to whether “in all the circumstances, the directors acted 
in the best interests of the corporation, having regard to all relevant 
considerations, including, but not confined to, the need to treat af-
                                                                                                                      
257 See Brant Invs., [1991] 3 O.R.3d. at 301. 
258 See BCE Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. at 598. 
259 Id. 
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fected stakeholders in a fair manner, commensurate with the corpora-
tion’s duties as a good corporate citizen.”260 Before the court examines 
whether the complainant has been oppressed, however, it must first 
establish that the complainant’s expectations were reasonable or le-
gitimate. 
 In assessing the threshold issue of whether the debentureholders 
reasonably held the expectation that the directors of BCE Inc. would 
have maintained the trading value of their debentures as investment 
grade, the Supreme Court indicated that it could take into account 
whether the debentureholders could have protected themselves against 
the harm they claim to have suffered.261
 
The court also stated that it 
would examine whether the directors attempted to resolve the conflict-
ing interests of the various stakeholders and those of the corporation 
“in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of 
the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.”262 As suggested 
above, this statement suggests that the corporation’s duties as a “good 
corporate citizen” require its management to consider the interests of 
all of its stakeholders, not only its shareholders.263 This implication is 
not at all consistent with the adoption of a shareholder primacy model 
of corporate governance. 
c. A Comparison of Statutory Remedies 
 Although a complainant in Canada is eligible to bring either a de-
rivative action (with leave of the court) or an oppression claim, and 
may, in fact, join the two, in most circumstances the action giving rise to 
a derivative action claim will not give rise to an oppression remedy, and 
vice versa. Thus, complainants do not have the ability to choose wheth-
er to pursue a derivative action or an oppression remedy absent special 
or unique circumstances in which harm can be caused to both the cor-
poration and to its shareholders from the same conduct.264 
                                                                                                                      
260 Id. 
261 Id. at 597. 
262 Id. at 597–98. 
263 Id. at 598 (stating “[t]here is no principle that one set of interests—for example the 
interests of shareholders—should prevail over another set of interests”). 
264 See Charlebois v. Bienvenue, [1967] 2 O.R. 635, 644 (Can.) (finding that the hold-
ing of an annual meeting and election of directors after directors had sent out a mislead-
ing information circular was a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty to the corporation). 
In discussing this judgment, the Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that this action would 
also be a breach of duty to the shareholders as well as a breach of duty to the corporation. 
See Goldex Mines Ltd., [1974] 7 O.R.2d at 218–19. 
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 In the absence of such rare circumstances, the determination of 
which of these causes of action is appropriate hinges on a court’s as-
sessment of the party suffering the primary harm from the act alleged 
to have occurred, as cited in a complaint. Accordingly, if an action 
causes harm to a corporation and has incidental effects on its share-
holders, a derivative action is the only appropriate claim. For example, 
where an impugned action causes a corporation to become insolvent, 
thereby resulting in a loss of shareholder equity, the shareholders’ loss 
is deemed to be merely incidental to the primary harm to the corpora-
tion. Consequently, a derivative action, not an oppression remedy, is the 
appropriate claim.265 
 As with the conclusions drawn from the analyses of notable U.S. 
cases such Dodge, Shlensky, Unocal, Revlon, and Paramount, the Canadian 
Supreme Court’s judgments in Peoples and BCE Inc. clearly demonstrate 
that Hansmann and Kraakman’s assertion of the triumph of the share-
holder primacy model does not hold sway in Canada. Moreover, these 
judgments are consistent with the structure of Canadian division of 
powers corporations statutes, which illustrate—particularly through the 
breadth of the derivative action and the existence of the oppression 
remedy—that the shareholder primacy model does not accurately de-
scribe the operation of corporate governance in Canada. 
Conclusion 
 On the basis of the arguments posed herein, it may fairly be stated 
that Hansmann and Kraakman’s bold proclamation of the end of his-
tory for corporate law is, at best, premature, and, at worst, incorrect. 
                                                                                                                      
265 See Hercules Mgmt. Ltd., [1997] 2 S.C.R. at 175. Shareholders acting in the capacity 
of supervising management’s conduct relied on negligently prepared auditor reports. 
Shareholders made decisions in reliance on those reports, which resulted in the corpora-
tion going into receivership. As a result, the shareholders lost their equity in the corpora-
tion. They sought an oppression remedy against the auditors in order to recover their lost 
equity. The Canadian Supreme Court held that the audit reports were prepared to allow 
the shareholders to supervise management’s conduct and to make decisions concerning 
the administration of the corporation. Consequently, the court determined that the 
shareholders were not relying on the audit reports to protect their own individual inter-
ests, but, in the “managerial role” they undertook, they relied on the reports to act for the 
general benefit of the corporation. The court concluded that the primary harm caused by 
the negligently prepared reports was to the corporation, which went into receivership, with 
the shareholders suffering an incidental harm—the loss of their equity in the corporation. 
See id. at 212–13; see also Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1039 
(Del. 2004) (“The stockholder must demonstrate that the duty breached was owed to the 
stockholder and that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the corpora-
tion.”). 
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This Article has provided various bases to suggest that the confidence 
with which they made their pronouncement has little substantive foun-
dation in either U.S. or Canadian corporate jurisprudence. 
 Prominent U.S. corporate judgments as discussed in Part II.A fit 
far less comfortably with Hansmann and Kraakman’s suggestion of the 
end of history for corporate law than may have previously been sur-
mised. These corporate judgments include Dodge v. Ford, Shlensky v. 
Wrigley, and Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., which are generally regarded 
as the beacons for shareholder primacy advocates, and Revlon Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., which advocates the need to maxi-
mize shareholder benefits upon the inevitable breakup of a company 
subject to a takeover bid. Hansmann and Kraakman’s assertion of the 
triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation would, 
therefore, appear to be premised more upon conjecture and the power 
of suggestion, rather than upon a solid foundation in legal reality. 
 The Canadian Supreme Court’s recent judgments in Peoples and 
BCE Inc. reveal a rather different understanding of management’s du-
ties in corporate governance than the view espoused by Hansmann and 
Kraakman. So, too, does the structure of Canadian corporate law stat-
utes, as evidenced by the physical and conceptual separation of man-
agement’s fiduciary duties from its duty of care, the broader range of 
individuals granted standing to bring derivative actions on behalf of 
corporations in Canada than in the United States, and the existence of 
the statutory oppression remedy that provides significant relief for a 
broad range of aggrieved corporate stakeholders. 
 This is not to suggest that the shareholder primacy model is an 
entirely unattractive one. It appears to be a simple solution, buttressed 
by the “science” of law and economics. It is certainly easier to discern 
the success of management in fulfilling this model by looking to the 
price of corporate shares than it is to satisfy a broader constituency-
based approach, which requires the satisfaction of multiple stakeholder 
interests. It might also be argued that the disparate interests of stake-
holders under progressive models of corporate governance facilitate a 
“duty to many equals yet a duty to none” syndrome. 
 Fulfilling a stakeholder-centered model of corporate governance is 
necessarily more difficult than satisfying the shareholder primacy model. 
Appearances are often deceiving, however. The fact that the shareholder 
primacy model is easier to fulfill says nothing about whether it is a more 
appropriate basis for assessing the role of corporate management in cor-
porate governance. The shareholder primacy model also places an inor-
dinate amount of emphasis on share price, which might also encourage 
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share price manipulation or shady accounting practices to achieve that 
goal, as most notably seen in the Enron scandal. 
 Although the apparent simplicity and definitiveness of the share-
holder primacy model is attractive, it drastically oversimplifies matters. 
As Plato once suggested in his dialogue Statesman, “A perfectly simple 
principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse 
of simple.”266 Corporate law is complex, and attempts to oversimplify it 
are either bound to fail or, at a minimum, to mislead. Nonetheless, the 
idea that corporate governance ought to be understood solely by refer-
ence to theories of shareholder primacy is often treated by its propo-
nents as if it was so obvious that everyone must accept it. 
 Indeed, Hansmann and Kraakman begin their article “The End of 
History for Corporate Law” by asserting that “there is no longer any se-
rious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive 
to increase long-term shareholder value.”267 They conclude in much the 
same way, stating that “the triumph of the shareholder-oriented model 
of the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured.”268 This 
posturing269 has come largely in the place of substantive argument. In 
fact, it is almost as if they are asking readers to see shapes in the clouds 
simply by the force of suggestion. This is reminiscent of a dialogue in 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet between Hamlet and Polonius: 
 Hamlet: Do you see yonder cloud that’s almost in the shape 
of a camel? 
 Polonius: By th’ mass, and ’tis like a camel indeed. 
 Hamlet: Methinks, it is a weasel. 
 Polonius: It is back’d like a weasel. 
 Hamlet: Or like a whale? 
 Polonius: Very like a whale.270 
 There is no need for those who study corporate law to play Polo-
nius to the shareholder primacy Hamlets who seek to fill their heads 
with inappropriate characterizations of the status of contemporary cor-
porate governance. The latter’s insinuations and conclusions are as 
amorphous as the clouds upon which they are based. This does not 
mean that we ought not listen to what shareholder primacy advocates 
have to say, only that we ought not uncritically accept it as gospel. As 
                                                                                                                      
266 Plato, Statesman, in The Dialogues of Plato 322 (Benjamin Jowett ed., 1937). 
267 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 439. 
268 Id. at 468. 
269 See Hansmann, How Close Is the End of History?, supra note 45, at 745. 
270 William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 3, sc. 2. 
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Winkler has indicated, the conclusion that corporate law has reached 
the end of history rests “on an artificially narrow understanding of cor-
porate governance.”271 Nevertheless, the basis for the same assertion 
made herein differs from the rationale that he offers for it. 
 Winkler argues that the existence of broader stakeholder protec-
tions that sit outside of “traditional” corporate law serve as a basis for 
contesting Hansmann and Kraakman’s claim of the end of history for 
corporate law. As Winkler explains it: 
Despite the common conception of corporate governance as 
pertaining to shareholder-management relations, the actual 
decisionmaking of corporate officers is heavily constrained by 
legal rules from outside of corporate law. . . . One must take 
into account environmental law, labor law, civil rights law, 
workplace safety law, and pension law, lest one be left with a 
distorted and incomplete view of how the law actually shapes 
those corporate decision matrices.272 
This Article does not suggest that Winkler is incorrect in his assertions 
about the implications of the broader area of business law on corporate 
behavior and governance. Rather, it contends that the same conclusion 
can be reached within the narrower field of corporate law itself. 
 A noted commentator has provided the following appraisal of cor-
porate management’s duties: 
I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era 
which has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its 
mistakes, and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to 
observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, 
that “a man cannot serve two masters.” . . . No thinking man 
can believe that an economy built upon a business foundation 
can permanently endure without some loyalty to that princi-
ple.273 
These words were written in 1934 by former U.S. Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Harlan Stone. Nevertheless, they remain as relevant today as 
they were then. Directors cannot properly serve the best interests of 
corporations and shareholders when the interests of these groups are 
frequently not aligned. Chief Justice Stone’s emphasis on the contin-
                                                                                                                      
271 Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Gov-
ernance at the End of History, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109, 133 (2004). 
272 Id. at 128. 
273 Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (1934). 
272 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 33:219 
ued importance of foundational principles in corporate law may also be 
seen to parallel the sentiments of President Barack Obama in his inau-
gural speech characterizing the challenges that lie ahead for the Unit-
ed States as a result of the current economic climate: 
That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. . . . 
Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and 
irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective 
failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new 
age. . . .  Nor is the question before us whether the market is a 
force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand 
freedom is unmatched. But this crisis has reminded us that 
without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control— 
the nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the pros-
perous. . . . Our challenges may be new. The instruments with 
which we meet them may be new. But those values upon 
which our success depends—honesty and hard work, courage 
and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism— 
these things are old. These things are true. They have been 
the quiet force of progress throughout our history. What is 
demanded then is a return to these truths.274 
 The reality of contemporary corporate law is that, some seventy 
years after the Berle-Dodd debate over corporate purpose and more 
than fifty years after Berle conceded defeat to Dodd’s vision, corporate 
law scholars continue to argue over the most appropriate model of 
corporate governance.275
 
This Article adds to a debate that is not likely 
to end soon. Such a situation is certainly not consistent with the “end of 
history” for corporate law. 
                                                                                                                      
274 President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address ( Jan. 20, 2009), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/. 
275 See Stout, supra note 133, at 1200 (arguing that the true issue emanating from the 
Berle-Dodd debate is which choice is worse, “to require directors to maximize shareholder 
wealth, even . . . where shareholder wealth maximization is inefficient? Or to allow direc-
tors to look at the interests of nonshareholder ‘stakeholders,’ recognizing that they may 
use their enhanced discretion to serve themselves?”). 
